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The key dynamics of the transatlantic banking crisis are analyzed – with emphasis on the fact 
that the banking disaster of 2007/08 was not really a surprise –, and the five key 
requirements for restoring stability and efficiency in the EU/OECD banking sector are 
highlighted. Most important, however, is the introduction of a new tax regime designed to 
encourage bankers to take a more long term time horizon in decision-making and to reduce 
excessive risk-taking. Banks and funds should be taxed not only on the basis of profits but 
also on the basis of the variability – read variance – of the rate of return on equity: the higher 
the variability over time the higher the tax to be paid. The quality and comprehensiveness of 
banks’ balance sheets must be radically improved and all off-balance sheet activities must be 
included in future total balance sheets. The medium term structure of employment in terms of 
the breakdown nontradables/tradables will have to adjust. 
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on the fact that the banking disaster of 2007/08 was not really a surprise –, and the five key 
requirements for restoring stability and efficiency in the EU/OECD banking sector are 
highlighted: Hedge funds should be regulated and be required to register with the Bank of 
International Settlements, which should have the right to tighten equity capital requirements if 
deemed necessary. The quality and comprehensiveness of banks’ balance sheets must be 
radically improved and all off-balance sheet activities must be included in future total balance 
sheets (TBS). Securitization is a useful financial innovation, yet asset backed securities (ABS) 
should become more standardized and every bank selling ABS should declare its willingness 
to buy back this package at any point of time at a minimum of 50% of the initial transaction 
price. All credit default swaps (CDS) must be registered in a global database, and future 
transaction should go through a clearing house. Previous CDS transactions must also be 
recorded, since a critical veil of ignorance of counterparty risk would otherwise continue and 
hence the uncertainty about the valuation of large portfolio positions of banks, funds and 
insurance companies would continue. Financing of rating should be indirect, namely every 
country or company planning to place bonds in the market should pay fees into a pool, and 
this pool then finances the respective rating on a competitive basis. This two-stage approach 
of financing ratings would most likely eliminate the existing conflicts of interest in the present 
regime. Most important, however, is the introduction of a new tax regime designed to 
encourage bankers to take a more long term time horizon in decision-making and to reduce 
excessive risk-taking. Banks and funds should be taxed not only on the basis of profits but 
also on the basis of the variability – read variance – of the rate of return on equity: the higher 
the variability over time the higher the tax to be paid (a simple calculation for Germany shows 
that based on historical data the large private banks would have paid the highest overall tax 
rate). As regards Basel III one should note that Basel I/II rules are flawed in the sense that 
raising the equity-loan ratio is assumed – in the logic of the existing Basel arrangements – to 
create a better cushion against risk and adverse shocks to profitability, respectively. However, 
theoretical analysis clearly shows that raising the equity ratio implies in an aggregate 
perspective that the (relative) credit multiplier is increased which in turn could bring about a 
rise of volatility and risk, respectively. There is an equity capital paradox since the 
macroeconomic implications of standard regulation contradict the microeconomic approach of 
equity requirements which suggests that raising the equity ratio will improve the survival 
probability of banks. The microeconomic approach implicit in Basel I/II regulations is 
inadequate for achieving a stable banking system. EU15 countries have been affected by the 
banking crisis in a limited way, the shock to eastern European accession countries has been 
much stronger. Labor market effects of the international banking crisis in Eastern Europe 
might be less dramatic than in Western Europe, but political unrest might become serious if 
the global recession cannot be overcome quickly. To the extent that the US banking crisis and 
the global recession signal that the previous economic pattern of international resource 
allocation – including the high US current account deficit – is not sustainable there are new 
challenges for countries with a structural surplus in the current account: If the US savings rate 
should increase in the medium term, surplus countries such as Germany, China and Japan will 
face declining export growth. From this perspective, fiscal policy packages in these countries 
should consider a specific focus on the expansion of the nontradables sector, that is measures 
which raise the relative price of nontradable products. The medium term structure of 
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  31.  Introduction 
Financial market globalization was reinforced in the decade following 1995, and one might 
expect major benefits from sustainable globalization. There is no doubt that securitization of 
loans and foreign direct investment of banks as well as internationalization of the banking 
business has intensified over time (DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, 2008; ECB, 2008); the 
home bias in the use of savings – emphasized in earlier empirical analysis of 
FELDSTEIN/HORIOKA (1980) – has reduced over time, particularly in the EU 
(JUNGMITTAG/UNTIEDT, 2002). While one should expect considerable benefits from 
financial globalization organized in a consistent framework, such globalization can have 
negative national and international collateral effects if the institutional framework is 
incomplete and inconsistent: a low degree of transparency resulting from this could raise 
systemic risks and generate negative international external effects. The international banking 
crisis which started in 2007 in the US subprime mortgage market shows that the institutional 
framework is incomplete and that there is a broad challenge for the EU countries and other 
OECD countries as well as China, India and other NICs in implementing a new global 
financial architecture. At the same time the US, the euro zone and other countries will have to 
adopt reforms in the domestic sphere. For the euro zone, the transatlantic banking crisis is a 
welcome test for its institutional set up, and it seems that the euro zone countries are doing 
rather well in the difficult transatlantic crisis; the ECB and several central banks deserve 
credit for flexible and rather consistent crisis management in 2008, although the crisis has not 
yet been fully resolved. 
Based on the Basel I rules, there should not be much reason to worry about stability of the 
banking system, since regulations require internationally active banks to fulfill a minimum 
equity capital-loan ratio of 8%. Under Basel II there is a more differentiated approach which 
measures bank capital and portfolios on the basis of risks so that 8% applies to a risk-
weighted portfolio of the bank. Moreover, there is a distinction between tier 1 capital (in the 
EU usually 4%, in the UK 6%), tier 2 capital (8% requirement) and tier 3 capital. Based on 
the method chosen for risk assessment – external rating or two alternative internal rating 
approaches –, the capital requirements will slightly differ. The basic logic of the Basel I/II 
approach is that an individual bank will face favorable survival prospects if its equity capital-
loan ratio is sufficiently high. This logic, however, is flawed at the aggregate level as can be 
shown easily (see appendix 5). Changing the Basel equity requirements is at least as important 
as the issue of pro-cyclicality of Basel II rules. The basic point is that raising the equity-loan 
ratio does not simply improve the air bag of the individual bank, rather at the aggregate level 
it is prone to bring about an increase in the ratio of the credit multiplier to the money 
multiplier, which implies a greater likelihood of increasing and excessive volatility of asset 
prices and hence of risk. By implication, minimum equity capital requirement should be 
carefully redefined under Basel III, and there is indeed an optimum capital requirement in a 
macroeconomic perspective. However, the main focus of the subsequent analysis is on 
overcoming the existing banking crisis, and several institutional innovations will be suggested 
as new remedies.  
The USA has faced a banking crisis in 2007/08 which spilled over to Europe and later to the 
whole world. This major crisis brought about enormous depreciations on portfolios of banks 
and funds and could entail a new Great Depression as the real economies in OECD countries, 
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2008, the US government and European governments organized multi-billion dollar rescue 
packages to recapitalize banks, but national governments have not addressed the true 
structural problems. Iceland, Hungary, the Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia were among the 
countries facing balance-of-payments financing problems in October 2008. The euro zone’s 
financial market stability was relatively satisfactory, while the epicenter of the banking crisis 
was in the US and to some extent in the UK, where banking supervisors had followed a 
similar benign neglect-attitude as their counterparts in the US. In the euro zone, Spain 
(CALVO-HORNERO/SANCHEZ, 2008) and to some extent Italy pursued rather strict 
regulatory approaches, which have helped them avoid facing major subprime problems. The 
US subprime mortgage markets were the trigger of the financial market crisis in August 2007, 
but there is no doubt that the whole US banking system was off-course with respect to 
sustainable banking in 2007. It is quite important to understand what went wrong, since 
successfully fighting the crisis requires measures based on adequate theoretical analysis. 
While the G20 meeting in November 2008 came up with a long list of 47 measures to be 
considered, it is doubtful that the key reform elements necessary were on the radar screen of 
policymakers. Overcoming the strange confidence crisis among banks is one of the key 
challenges as is a more realistic and more long-term profit maximization strategy of banks 
and other actors in financial markets. Better regulation and more regulation for big banks in 
the US and other OECD countries are also high on the agenda. Beyond the financial sector – 
shaped by high innovation dynamics, high volatility in 2008 and declining confidence among 
banks –, the focus of policymakers is on the real economy with consensus forecasts for 2009 
being rather bleak. This holds despite the big interest rate cuts of OECD central banks in the 
second half of 2008, which were designed to contain the turbulence to financial markets and 
to avoid a big recession.  
Financial markets are crucial for financing investment and innovation, thus they are 
indispensible for economic growth (SAINT-PAUL, 1992). Asymmetric information and 
moral hazard problems are specific aspects of financial markets and thus financial markets are 
not working perfectly. There could be credit rationing under specific circumstances 
(STIGLITZ/WEISS, 1981). The risk of bank runs is specific to the banking sector and hence 
the confidence of depositors and depositor protection are crucial elements of the institutional 
setup in the banking industry (DIAMOND/DYBVIG, 1983). From a theoretical perspective, 
there are sound arguments for why there should be ex-ante rules – regulations – for banks 
(DEWATRIPONT/TIROLE, 1995) and not simply an application of the general competition 
law whose rules apply ex post, except for the field of merger control. Central banks are 
interested in systemic stability, as turbulences could undermine the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, and certainly investors and the general public have a strong interest in systemic 
stability (DE BANDT/HARTMANN, 2000). For EU countries eager to create capital-based 
pension systems – as a complementary element to pay-as-you-go systems – the stability of 
financial markets is also quite crucial. While many banks run stress tests, it is unclear to 
which extent such tests are tailored adequately. From an economist’s perspective, one may 
wonder whether prudential supervisors run simulations on the bankruptcy of individual banks. 
Part of the Economics research community was not really good in understanding the problems 
of the US subprime financing. For example, PEEK/WILCOX (2006) argued on the basis of 
empirical analysis that the growth of asset backed securities markets had contributed to 
stabilizing housing investment in the US. 
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innovations, investment and instability which is a Schumpeterian perspective on financial and 
real instability (MINSKY, 1990). Financial innovation such as securitization and asset-
splitting had already been created in the 1980s (BIS, 1986). An increasing role for private 
equity funds has been observed since the 1990s, and such funds have reinforced the 
adjustment and innovation pressure on firms. In certain cases, however, they have also 
weakened the long term ability of firms acquired to survive in the market (VAN DEN 
BURG/RASMUSSEN, 2007). The innovation dynamics of the real sector in turn affects asset 
markets, in particular stock markets; patents affect the stock market prices significantly 
(GRILICHES/HALL/PAKES, 1991). In imperfect capital markets, equity capital is important 
not least for financing international M&As, and a real depreciation of the currency – implying 
that foreign investors have a larger amount of equity capital expressed in the currency of the 
target country – will bring about higher foreign direct investment inflows relative to GDP (for 
the case of the US see FROOT/STEIN, 1991). Thus, the international banking crisis must be 
explained in a broader context. An interesting feature of the US crisis is the fact that the US 
could still attract high capital inflows in 2007/08, although its current account-deficit GDP 
ratio had reached 5-6% in that period. While conventional modeling suggests that high 
cumulated current account deficits imply a depreciation of the exchange rate 
(HANSEN/RÖGER, 2000), the US has experienced a rather strong appreciation of its 
currency in the second half of 2008, where a nominal appreciation reinforced the effect from 
the rise in the price level.  
These puzzling effect as well as other issues must be analyzed, and one may ask to which 
extent the US is able to stabilize its economic system. While the US as a large economy 
should indeed be able to stabilize its banking system (paradoxically, part of the US 
automotive industry, including GM, is an element of the banking sector) through adequate 
policy measures, it is nevertheless obvious that a further acceleration of the banking crisis in 
2009/2010 – fuelled by a strong US recession weakening banks further – could bring serious 
problems, as neither private US investors nor private investors from OECD countries are 
likely to be willing to recapitalize US banks if necessary. The US government and US banks 
would have to approach sovereign investment funds abroad, which politically would be a 
conflict-prone alternative. Another option would be further capital injections through the 
government, but such state-ownership of banks stands in sharp contrast to the principles of the 
US system. The options for international bank refinancing in the OECD are also weak, and 
this is largely due to the disaster with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. 
The transatlantic banking crisis intensified after the US decided to let Lehman Brothers go 
bankrupt on September 15: a decision which was totally inconsistent given the previous 
bailout of the smaller investment bank Bear Stearns in March 2008; and taking into account 
that a few days later AIG, the giant insurance company, had been saved by the US 
government. The bankruptcy of Lehman in the midst of the banking crisis has fully destroyed 
confidence in OECD interbank markets and thus represents an irresponsible step on the part 
of the Bush administration. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae had been rescued by government, 
not least under the pressure of China whose central bank held large amounts of bonds issues 
by those two semi-public mortgage banks. It seems that neither the EU nor Japan had warned 
the US not to let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt – the large majority of unsecured claims 
against Lehman Brothers was in Japan and the EU, while the US share was only about 10%. 
While the US government might have speculated that Lehman Brothers would be a cheap 
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in interbank markets of OECD countries. Thus the Bush administration committed a serious 
policy failure with large global negative external effects – with costs greatly exceeding simply 
the wiping out of international claims vis-à-vis Lehman Brothers. Lehman Brothers going 
under chapter 11 signaled that no bank in the US was safe; and a fortiori, no bank in Europe.  
In 2004, Wall Street Investment Bankers achieved a softening of SEC regulations, namely 
that the permissible leverage ratio was raised to 40 – but in the end this softening only raised 
the speed of high-risk investment banking, and all major investment banks went under or were 
merged with traditional banks in 2008. There are serious doubts that value-added of 
investment banks on Wall Street were positive in the period 2002-08; the losses incurred and 
losses imposed on other banks, firms and countries most likely have exceed profits and wages 
paid in that period. Moreover, big banks in the US – all too big to fail – obtained government 
capital and thus it seemed that those banks faced a soft budget constraint, a phenomenon 
which had been emphasized by KORNAI (1980) in his book about socialist command 
economies. While his argument referred to banks and firms, the US case is mainly limited to 
the banking system, but if ailing automotive firms and other sectors would also come under 
the umbrella of the US government, the soft budget phenomenon would gain in relevance. 
The $700 billion rescue package offered by the US Congress for saving the banks and 
insurance companies – to this sum one must also add some $250 billion for rescuing Bear 
Stearns and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – will have been spent by mid-2009, and there is 
some risk that the US government will have to come up with even higher amounts of capital 
injections, guarantees and subsidies in the coming years. The recession of 2008/09 will 
aggravate the problems of banks and insurance companies, and depreciations of portfolios 
will become a serious problem again. 
The IMF (2008) warned early that depreciations of banks and hedge funds and investment 
funds could reach about $1000 bill. worldwide, while updates of the IMF in the summer of 
2008 suggested even higher figures. Moreover, the Stability Report of the BANK OF 
ENGLAND (2008) in autumn 2008 warned that depreciations could reach even $ 2.8 trillion. 
Such depreciations would partly reflect the impact of the recessions in the US, the UK and 
other countries affected by the international banking crisis. This crisis which apparently 
started in the US subprime mortgage market in 2007 and caused major problems in the 
interbank market accelerated in the summer of 2008 – with the collapse of the US investment 
bank Lehman Brothers on September 15 causing market panic.  
In a historical perspective, the US banking crisis is the most severe crisis since the Great 
Depression, and the enormous international collateral damages and high costs to the US 
economy – facing recession in 2008/09 – raises the question about the causes of this disaster, 
the impact of the international banking crisis and the options for dealing with the crisis. As 
regards the latter, one should clearly make a distinction between crisis management necessary 
to overcome the banking crisis in the short run and the structural reforms required in the 
context of more long-term systemic changes. 
In the short run it will be necessary to save the banking systems in the US, the UK and the 
euro zone. Without a stable banking system there is a serious risk of another Great 
Depression. Governments have offered multi-billion dollar packages for partial 
nationalization of banks – read recapitalization of banks – and guarantees for banks which 
want to sell bonds in a shaky securities market and an almost non-existent interbank market. 
Given the small number of big US banks, competition among banks is rather weak as there is 
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large share of unsecured claims of US private and corporate citizens; hence the Lehman 
Brothers case is not really a counter-example).  
Banks have lost confidence in each other, and the starting point was the growing tendency of 
bankers in the US (and Europe) to avoid regulatory equity requirements by transforming loans 
into asset-backed securities which could be sold in the capital market and often ended up in 
the special investment vehicles created by the banks themselves. The banks thus have created 
a market for lemons problem; that is, there was increasing quality uncertainty among bankers 
who could no longer draw reliable information from balance sheets about the financial status 
of potential partner banks. The classical lemons problem (AKERLOF, 1970) which had been 
identified as a potential source for market failure in goods markets is now visible in financial 
markets; with confidence among banks declining liquidity for many products has dried up. 
Since banks no longer trust each other, the refinancing of banks through state-guaranteed 
bonds is one of the few alternatives for restarting both the interbank market and the capital 
market. This will go along with mergers & acquisitions and government participation in major 
banks as well as other bail-out measures of governments. The governments of the US and of 
many EU countries have strongly intervened in the banking markets, creating thereby bigger 
banks as part of the rescue operations in the US. Such developments are, however, in contrast 
to what structural reforms require, namely more competition among private banks and 
dismemberment of large banks in order to bring about effective competition. The following 
analysis takes a look at the dynamics of the banking crisis (section 2), considers some key 
theoretical aspects (section 3) and suggests necessary reforms in the EU and at the global 
policy level (section 4). In the appendix serious doubts about Basel regulatory equity rules are 
raised: the Basel I-rule as well as the Basel II-rule raise the likelihood of a banking crisis.  
  82.  The Dynamics of the Banking Crisis 
At first glance, the US banking crisis started in subprime mortgage financing, as house prices 
started to fall in 2007. This implied serious doubts about the value of mortgage-backed 
securities largely held by special purpose vehicles (SPVs) of banks which had organized 
increasing off-balance sheet activities through SPV. Most SPVs held large positions of asset-
backed securities (ABS) which represented loan portfolios which had been sold in national 
and international capital markets. The originate-to-distribute model which became popular in 
the late 1990s assumed that banks could easily sell loan portfolios in the capital market; banks 
created SPVs to unload ABS and to widen off-balance sheet activities. Hence the incentive for 
banks to broaden risk management was weakened and this held all the more as banks 
alternatively could not sell a loan portfolio but rather only the risk associated with that 
portfolio (we will refer to the relevant credit default swaps – the insurance instruments part of 
which was traded in the market – subsequently). As SPVs relied on refinancing through short-
term commercial papers, the collapse of the US commercial paper market in summer 2007 
forced banks to take the portfolios of their respective SPVs back into their own books – the 
credit lines which banks had given to their respective SPVs when setting up the SPVs were 
enormous and had not really been meant to be drawn upon. The very purpose of the large 
credit line was to get a top rating for the SPV and to thereby make sure that the SPV had low 
refinancing costs.  
Falling house prices in the US had undermined confidence of investors into mortgage-based 
securities (MBS) held by SPVs and problems with refinancing MBS indicated serious 
problems in the ABS market. The price of portfolios representing MBS related to the 
mortgage subprime market in the US fell quickly in summer 2007. However, the crisis was 
not confined to the US. In the UK, a bank run on Northern Rock occurred in 2007, and the 
government quickly decided to save the bank whose problems could have been anticipated if 
the regulator had more carefully studied the aggressive expansion strategy of that mortgage 
bank (MULLINEUX, 2007). In early 2008 the UK government decided to nationalize 
Northern Rock and this became the starting point to heavy government involvement in the 
UK banking crisis. British banks had largely adopted similar business models as their US 
counterparts and several banks were involved in the markets for MBS/ABS. As refinancing of 
SPVs became more and more difficult in summer and autumn 2007 the prices of the 
respective assets fell strongly: lack of liquidity in the markets became a major problem.  
The US banking crisis is serious and has undermined the stability of the US and the 
transatlantic financial system. While the FED – through cutting interest rates sharply – and the 
US government have taken emergency measures to stabilize the economy, there is no sign that 
the US has adopted adequate structural reforms. With the quasi-nationalization of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac (plus Citibank), the US has indeed paid a high prize for the lingering 
mismanagement of the banking crisis and for years of insufficient prudential supervision as 
well as a framework which allows rating firms to effectively operate on very weak 
professional standards (USSEC, 2008). The latter has contributed to the subprime crisis and 
the collapse of the interbank markets in the US and Europe. Moreover, there were strange 
developments which have almost fully eliminated the normal risk premia – e.g., measured 
through the spread between corporate bonds with A-rating and government bond yields – in 
the US from 2003 to 2006 (GOODHART, 2007). Too many A-rated subprime bonds were 
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mortgage-based securities, exploding in volume between 2002 and 2006, could easily obtain 
an A rating in the US.  
It is widely accepted that the US banking crisis started in the summer of 2007 when the 
housing prices started to fall and doubts about the substance of mortgage-based securities 
(MBS) spread, thus making the refinancing of special investment vehicles – with a strong 
focus on asset-backed securities (ABS)/MBO –increasingly difficult. However, the sources of 
the fragility of US banks and financial markets dates back to the late 1990s when hedge funds 
with high rates of return on equity created enormous pressure for Wall Street Banks.  
•  The unregulated hedge funds with their high rates of return – about 20% in the late 
1990s – put enormous pressure on banks to come up with similar rates of return on 
equity. Twenty-five percent became a kind of magic number announced by top 
managers of US banks and with some delay also by bankers in the EU. Raising the 
return on equity became a top priority of bankers and stock markets, and the owners of 
banks quoted on the stock market cheered when top managers announced ever higher 
target rates of return – although basic Economics suggests that even a rate of return on 
equity of 15% would be quite remarkable if achieved over an extended period of time. 
The UBS in the US has indeed created its own hedge funds. Many banks in the US 
and the EU created off-balance sheet activities and special purpose vehicles to raise 
the rate of return; SPVs invested in ABS/MBS and collateralized debt obligation 
(CDOs) – CDO are repacked bundles of ABS with specific tranches in terms of risk 
profiles – and relied on short term commercial paper for refinancing. This model 
collapsed once the participants in commercial paper market faced doubts about the 
inherent value of mortgage-based securities (MBS). With US real estate prices falling 
in 2007, doubts emerged quickly, and banks had to take the papers of their respective 
SPVs back into the balance sheet. The basic point is not that house prices can fall over 
time; the key problem is that hedge funds were unregulated and their indirect role for 
systemic instability was not recognized. Most critics looked only at the problem of 
leverage in hedge funds, but the associated high pressure on banks to come up with 
higher returns was largely ignored. 
•  A very serious problem is the market for lemons problems created by banks 
themselves. With increasing off-balance sheet activities, effective banking operations 
could no longer be monitored through balance sheets. As rumors about problems in 
off-balance activities became wide-spread, the confidence in banks generally declined. 
A second problem is the lack of transparency and the incompleteness of balance 
sheets. To achieve this goal, banks created off-balance sheet activities, largely in the 
form of special investment vehicles, which bought long-term asset-backed securities 
and hoped to easily refinance those portfolios through short-term commercial papers; 
many banks had created ABS, since an expansion of the loan business could thus be 
reconciled with regulatory capital requirements. In order to get a top rating for the 
SPV and hence low financing costs, the respective SPV typically obtained a large 
credit line from the parent bank. Banks did not have to put up any equity capital for 
such credit lines under Basel I rules. 
•  Banks packed dozens of loans in asset-backed securities and sold ABS and related 
papers in the capital market. In many cases, the banks wanted to maintain the loans on 
their books but wanted to get rid of the risk associated with the loans; the financial 
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from special service providers and insurance companies – but CDS in term were 
traded in the capital market, mostly in the over the counter market. This market lacks 
transparency for both the prudential authorities and for the market as such. Regulators 
indeed allowed the CDSs to be sold around the world, and no one kept track of these 
transactions, although it would be wise to know those market participants representing 
the counterparty risk and whether they would be able to fully pay once the insurance 
case became reality. As lack of prudential supervision created a global veil of 
ignorance with respect to the allocation of CDS – there was no clearing house or 
global registry –, currency markets and bonds markets are not only facing an 
impossible challenge, namely to correctly assess risk premia for various countries (it 
makes a big difference if most CDS were held within the US, the euro zone, the UK or 
China). Moreover, the market value of the underlying loan portfolios also became 
difficult to assess as it makes a big difference whether there is credible insurance for 
the loan. Allocation of CDS across countries remained opaque, and hence the 
efficiency of financial market pricing remained low. While the US recorded high 
growth rates of credit in the period from 2000 to 2006, the risk premia in credit 
markets declined to nearly zero in the period from 2003 to 2006, which was quite an 
abnormal situation. Part of this phenomenon could be explained by overgenerous 
rating agencies which accorded top ratings to too many financial products and 
business models, including SPVs. 
•  Rating agencies often came up with fantasy ratings which were much too good to be 
true – e.g., even two days before Lehman went bankrupt, the leading US rating 
agencies had almost top ratings for the bank. Many ABS/MBS had top ratings, 
although it seems that the rating agencies’ methods were highly doubtful. In the 
context of Basel II, external ratings have a quasi-official status, and it is of paramount 
importance to make sure that ratings are carefully awarded and also swiftly corrected 
if needed over time. As long as ratings are flawed, there will be misjudgement of risks 
in capital markets and an underpricing of risks. US prudential supervision remained 
quite weak under the Bush administration. The USSEC – responsible for investment 
banks – was mainly interested in investor risk. However, it did not consider systemic 
risk issues, and the number of employees dealing with risk management fell 
dramatically under the presidency of George W. Bush. The Fed which was in charge 
of traditional banks (bank holdings) had adopted a laisser-faire-attitude under 
Chairman Greenspan; banks in the US and in the EU could incur increasing risks 
without regulators requiring enhanced risk management. Stability Reports of various 
central banks (Bank of England; ECB) warned about the rising risk banks were taking 
within OECD countries, but the regulators and the banks ignored such warnings. 
Moreover, the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program analyzed many crucial 
OECD countries, except for the US. It was only in 2006 that the US government 
agreed to a report being published on the US system in 2009.  
•  Time horizons of managers and traders were rather short, and there were inadequate 
incentives for long term investment horizons in banks. Many top bankers pursued high 
risk strategies and generated high bonus payments for managers and traders as long as 
the economic boom – along with rising asset prices – continued in the US and Europe. 
In the medium term – as asset prices fell – many banks, however, suffered high 
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assumption of most textbook Economics – namely that investors maximize a profit 
function over a very long (infinite) time horizon – was not realistic, rather a hit and 
retire approach was often observed. As long as the boom continued, one could hit high 
goals, and once a crisis befell the market, early retirement was the ideal option for 
managers naturally willing to incur big risks for their respective banks. 
The following figure summarizes the key dynamics of the US banking crisis which resulted 
not only in the collapse of the commercial paper market and the interbank market in late 2007, 
but also in the US central bank and the ECB providing emergency liquidity to banks which no 
longer could obtain loans in the money market and the interbank market. Mistrust among 
banks in the euro zone is so great that more than €100 billion in excess reserves were kept at 
the ECB during several weeks in 2008, although market rates in the interbank markets were 
higher than what could be earned at the ECB account. It is not surprising that the problems in 
US real estate market and US banks brought about a fall of the stock market price index in 
2008; stock market prices in the euro zone also fell strongly in autumn 2008. 
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Coping successfully with the banking crisis and avoiding repeating this crisis within a few 
years can only be achieved if the causes of the banking crisis are recognized and adequate 
policy reforms be adopted. The problems in the US and European banking sectors are not 
really surprising if one considers the early warnings emphasizing the risk of falling house 
prices in the US – and ARTUS/VIRARD (2005), who warned that high rates of return on 
equity implied a high risk premium and hence incurring high risks.   
•  The laws of Economics imply that the in the long run the nominal interest rate i must 
be equal to the sum of the inflation rate and the real interest rate (r), and r must be 
equal to the growth rate of real output (gY). The rate of return on capital in turn should 
be equal to the risk free government bond interest rate i plus a risk premium Ω – in the 
stock market being equal to the price of risk times the variance of the stock market 
price. If the risk free nominal interest rate is 4% and the required rate of return on 
equity is 25% the implication is that the bank management aims at investment projects 
which stand for an average risk premium of 21%. Part of the typical strategy to chase 
for a high required rate of return of 25% was to use a high leverage (see appendix 3) 
through raising off-balance sheet activities which allowed one to by-pass the Basel I/II 
minimum requirements on regulatory capital. Many banks achieved 25% rates of 
  13return for a few years, but in 2007/08 they suffered high depreciations and massive 
losses so that there was no sustainable profit rate. As regards big banks’ volatility of 
rates of return on equity were rather high; e.g. considering the variance as a measure 
of volatility the case of Germany shows that volatility of rates of return of big banks 
were much higher than the volatility of savings banks, cooperative banks or 
Landesbanken/regional state-owned banks). 
•  The banks gave loans to the private sector, but loans were quickly sold as ABS or 
MBS in the capital market, thus making the incentive for the originator bank to screen 
those who took the loans weak; by implication risk management weakened. The 
originate-to-distribute model worked all the more poorly, the more stages of 
repackaging loans existed. When housing prices in the US fell, special investment 
vehicles holding MBS faced problems, since refinancing through short term 
commercial papers no longer worked, as the commercial paper market had collapsed. 
The market price of mortgage backed securities, particularly subprime securities, fell 
quickly and as banks were hardly able to give large credit lines to their respective 
SPVs, they took the SPV’s portfolios back into its books. Since the market price of 
MBS/subprime papers had fallen strongly in 2007/08, banks suffered high 
depreciations. The interbank market and the money market collapsed in 2008 as banks 
lost confidence in each other – not knowing how large off-balance stakes were on the 
one hand and how big risks associated with various portfolio positions, often involving 
previous CDS transactions, really were on the other hand. Banks stopped lending to 
each other or did so only against collateral which was unusual hitherto. In the euro 
zone, moreover, banks with high liquidity would rather channel excess liquidity into 
the accounts of the ECB than offer such liquidity overnight to banks at interest rates 
well above the central bank’s deposit rate. 
In fact the banking crisis is not a real surprise, and one has to blame both banks themselves 
and prudential supervisors in the US and the EU to have allowed such chaos in financial 
markets to emerge. The US dynamics largely show that the big banks no longer understood 
the system they had created and that US policymakers had failed to implement a clear system 
of supervision – instead the US had refused to adopt the Basel II rules which would have 
imposed at least a small amount of equity capital for extending large credit lines to special 
investment vehicles (in this perspective the UK banking sector looks better positioned than 
the US). By refusing to adopt Basel II, the US not only created an uneven transatlantic 
playing field for banks, but it also prevented greater transparency – in a world economy with 
high growth - from being achieved. 
The priority reforms are therefore obvious; they must correspond to the problems identified 
and should be adopted by the relevant policy layers: 
•  Regulation of hedge funds: Hedge funds – largely active from tax havens – with more 
than €1 billion should be required to register with the Bank of International 
Settlements; BIS must reserve the right to raise equity requirements if deemed 
necessary, and trading in CDS could be restricted. Hedge funds which do not comply 
with BIS rules must not be permitted to trade government bonds in any member 
country of the IMF; this clause might require that government bonds be traded only 
through international clearinghouses, thus excluding over-the counter trade – in this 
manner, tax havens would be subject to rules and guidelines set at the European and 
global policy level. 
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sheet includes all off-balance sheet activities; banks which do not comply must face 
sharply restricted access to central bank liquidity. The ECB (the central bank) should 
encourage interbank activities by according different discount rates, namely a low 
discount rate to banks strongly active in the interbank market; banks with low 
activities in the interbank market would face higher discount rates. Thus one would 
have an incentive for banks to engage in the interbank market. The enormous 
expansion of ECB liquidity provision in euro zone interbank markets is a doubtful 
exercise if it were to continue in the long run; this would undermine both the 
efficiency of monetary policy and the incentive of banks to engage in the interbank 
market, which is normally a market important for the efficiency of the banking system 
– monitoring and signaling are crucial elements of the normal competition process in 
the interbank market. 
•  ABS products must be standardized in order to avoid complex pricing problems, and 
all CDS should be registered in a global data bank; a bank issuing ABS should keep 
20% of the equity tranche in its books (this gives a strong incentive to really consider 
the risks contained in the loans which back the ABS) and declare its willingness to buy 
back the ABS product at 50% of the original price at any point in time, thereby 
avoiding pricing uncertainty even in the critical case that markets for specific financial 
products should collapse; the underestimation of liquidity risks, which was a serious 
element of the US/transatlantic banking crisis, must be avoided in the future. New 
transactions with CDS should be possible only through a clearinghouse, and previous 
CDS transactions should be required to register worldwide – otherwise, confidence in 
financial markets cannot be restored. 
•  Rating agencies must face new rules and should be required to obtain a license as 
proposed by the European Commission; in addition, there should be random checks 
and fines for poor rating accuracy. Conflicts of interests (in the traditional regime, 
banks placing a bond issue have paid the respective rating agency) must be avoided. 
Specifically, a two-stage financing procedure would be useful; banks, firms or 
governments wanting to place bonds in the market should pay into a pool, and this 
pool then would finance the rating process on the basis of competitive tenders. At the 
bottom line, fees to be paid should reflect market shares of issuers – with a top-up for 
weak ratings of the respective placement of bonds. Thus, the information derived from 
ratings should be considered as a public rather than a private good. It would be useful 
if the EU or the ECB would encourage the creation of at least one major European 
rating agency. 
•  A new tax regime is necessary for banks, funds and insurance companies. Taxing the 
profits (Π) of banks should be only one basis for taxation; in addition, the variability 
of the rate of return on equity should be considered. The higher the variance (V”) on 
the rate of return, the higher the overall tax rate to be applied should be. (The tax to be 
paid by an individual bank would thus be: T=τ’Π + τ”V”; e.g., for the case of 
Germany, the figures show that private big banks would have faced a high variance 
tax burden, τ”V”, as the variance of their return on equity was relatively high). Banks 
anticipating such a tax burden would have an incentive to take a more long-term view 
– in the long term, the variability should be smaller than in the short term, and bank 
managers can influence the variance of the respective bank’s rate of return. 
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A variance tax would be a true innovation in the OECD tax systems, but such a tax is indeed 
quite useful since it would help to avoid excessive short-term decision-making which results 
in excessive risk-taking and high negative national or international external effects (i.e., 
international instability spillovers and problems related to systemic instability causes by non-
sustainable bankers’ strategies). Indeed, a variance tax could be considered a special PIGOU 
tax which helps to internalize negative external effects. There could be a minor problem in 
recessions when the rate of return on equity falls, hence making the variance tax pro-cyclical; 
however, government could introduce a partial or full waiver for variance taxation in 
recessions.  
Taking stock of the key elements of the banking crisis identifies seven areas of weaknesses: 
(1) deficiencies of US banking regulation; the Paulson reform program, which suggests that 
the FED should have a larger role in regulation, is a doubtful program given the fact that the 
FED has not used existing regulatory power – its board has made clear for years that the best 
regulation effectively is no regulation. (2) There is a sustained problem of market failure in 
the US interbank markets and in EU interbank markets in 2007/08, which represents a self-
imposed market-for-lemon problem caused by insufficient financial reporting and opaque 
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namely to the extent that EU banks were squeezed out of the market – somewhat remedied by 
the transatlantic swap operations organized by the FED and its counterparts in Europe; the 
swap operations allow EU banks with US subsidiaries – they were effectively locked out of 
the US interbank market after the summer of 2007 – to obtain dollar loans from the ECB, 
which in turn has obtained a dollar loan from the FED. The European bank will then send the 
dollar liquidity to its US subsidiary, which is a very strange indicator of discrimination of 
foreign banks in the US interbank market. This could be understood as being counter to the 
GATS rules of the WTO. (4) From 2002 to 2006, leading US rating agencies have partly done 
sloppy work as the report by the USSEC (2008) has shown, and it is absolutely unclear why 
Basel II gives those rating agencies even more power – external ratings have an official status 
for risk management of banks – while not imposing decent standards and responsibilities. (5) 
The trigger for the banking crisis was not the subprime crisis but the strange increase in the 
required rate of return on capital on Wall Street at the beginning of the 21
st century. EU banks 
were afraid of being taken over by US banks if they could not match the new Wall Street 
benchmarks. (6) To a limited extent, the financial innovations adopted in the OECD banking 
world in the context of the originate-and-distribute approach is a useful way to deal with risk, 
but the excessive creation of A-rated ABS is doubtful, and systematic failure to consider 
liquidity risk raises doubts about the overall framework within which banks operate; (7) in 
Germany, there are major weaknesses in the field of banking supervision, and costs for the 
taxpayer of dealing with the IKB problems and part of the Landesbanken are already high – 
here, national reforms and EU reforms are necessary.  
The reforms suggested in the context of this analysis are urgent and will help to sort out the 
mess in the US financial markets and elsewhere. While overregulation should be avoided, 
there is a need for more and better regulation. Basically, there are seven key proposals for 
solving the banking crisis: (i) The interbank market is fully restored by forcing banks to 
disclose their positions in structured products and off-balance sheet activities. In particular, 
banks must fully disclose all off-balance sheet investments in the notes to the balance sheet; 
moreover, from a specific target rate on, banks must hold 20% of the equity part of asset-
backed securities; litigation among banks, which has increased in 2007/08 and increasingly 
destroys confidence in the markets, should be minimized and conflicts be sorted out quickly 
outside courtrooms to the greatest extent possible; (ii) only those banks which have met the 
new disclosure procedures and take full commitment to the equity part investment in ABS 
will get full access to central bank refinancing. These measures will restore confidence in the 
interbank market. In the EU, a new European Banking Standard Council should be established 
which monitors banks’ behaviour in world capital markets; strange behaviour and obvious 
problems in meeting legal requirements – e.g., UBS in the US from 1999 to 2008 – will have 
consequences, namely that banks considered in breach of critical rules and standards are 
excluded for at least five years from all transactions in the context of the emission of 
government bonds in the EU/euro zone. (iii) As regards the EU, greater efforts in terms of 
harmonizing national prudential supervision should be adopted; so far, the EU indeed offers a 
bewildering range of institutional arrangements – e.g., the central bank is involved in some 
countries, in some countries it is not involved at all and in still other countries it has exclusive 
competence for the supervision of banks and financial markets. (iv) The European 
Commission should publish regular reports on the banking systems in EU countries, and 
member countries should quantify the welfare costs of major banking crisis; in such a way, a 
new field of benchmarking would be established. Medium-sized and large hedge funds should 
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should also be introduced for central banks to impose a maximum leverage ratio.  In 
2006/2007, the IMF did a poor job in economic policy assessment; its lukewarm reports on 
the US economy were not in line with what sober analysis of the US economy and US 
economic policy – required as part of regular surveillance of IMF member countries – would 
have shown, namely critical faults in US prudential supervision and massive growth of credit 
along with strongly declining risk premia in US bonds markets from 2003 to 2006. The 
reporting procedures in the IMF should therefore be adjusted in a way which enables external 
experts to contribute to surveillance activities. Finally, within the WTO, it remains to be 
analyzed to which extent the asymmetric collapse of the US interbank market represents a 
discrimination of a foreign sense. The transatlantic banking crisis should be taken seriously, 
and adopting key reforms is urgent for both OECD countries and the global economy. If such 
reforms are not adopted in a timely fashion, there could be a backlash in globalization, and 
indeed some backlash in financial globalization has already become visible. As regards 
shoring up the shaky US housing market, the proposal of FELDSTEIN (2008) should be 
realized quickly. With respect to the costs of the US banking crisis, a preliminary assessment 
is that the per-capita-cost for every American is about $1,000 (mainly related to the Freddie 
Mae, Fannie Mac and Lehman Brothers failures), whereas the international external costs are 
about $360 billion annually in 2008 and 2009, which in turn is equivalent to $1,200 per US 
citizen. Such large external international costs are unacceptable in a fair global economic 
framework. The world economy is paying high costs for the lack of a consistent US 
regulatory framework. Financial globalization implies that sorting out the problems in the US 
banking market will be much more complex than the case of the BCCI bankruptcy in 1991. 
The banking rescue packages designed by the UK, Germany, France plus other EU countries 
and the US will hardly work, as they help to stabilize the banking systems only transitorily. 
As long as confidence in the interbank market is not restored, there is a risk of silent 
socialization of the banking system through ever-increasing liquidity injections from the 
central banks (plus explicit socialization through governments buying stocks and warrants of 
banks). Confidence in the interbank market can only be restored if parliaments in OECD 
countries adopt laws which force banks, hedge funds and the like to sell all products with 
CDS elements to a clearing house, which in turn then reallocates the CDS in a transparent 
way. Bank mergers sometimes could be a hidden avenue to raise the silent risk exposure of 
banks, as merging bank I and II typically implies that the bank taken over could have large 
stakes of CDOs part of which are a combination of ABS and CDS – products difficult to 
evaluate; such intransparency cannot be accepted and bank supervisory agencies and merger 
commissions should carefully look into the merger dynamics. The short-term options of 
saving the banking system – including M&As – are absolutely in contrast to what a solid 
efficient banking system looks like: smaller banks in a more competitive environment; the 
more mega banks (representing the ominous too-big-to-fail) there are, the more stricter 
regulations will have to be imposed. If the US does not accept Basel II+, there can be no free 
capital movement as the distorted US system would continue to create big international 
negative external effects (see appendix).  
 
  183.  Theoretical Aspects of Sustainable Financial Market 
Globalization 
As regards sustainable financial market integration, one can expect long term globalization 
only under certain conditions. Financial market integration can generate considerable benefits 
by reducing international transactions costs, stimulating financial product innovations and 
efficiency gains as well as through a better diversification of risks. However, those benefits 
will not be generated automatically; in a multi-country world economy, the leading countries 
must implement a consistent international framework which creates a competitive level 
playing field on the one hand and establishes clear responsibilities on the other hand; the 
requirements for sustainable globalization are as follows: 
•  Long term benefits on the basis of a consistent institutional framework and clear 
responsibilities can be expected; this implies that no major player in the world 
economy imposes large negative external effects on other countries – as it was the case 
with the US in 2007/08. The US policy in 2008 brought about a rise in the US 
inflation rate; about 5% was reached in summer 2008, and this imposes an inflation 
tax on those countries holding foreign reserves in US $; while one might argue that 
most foreign reserves are in dollar-denominated bonds, it is clear that the interest rate 
on US bonds is not really rising in parallel with the inflation rate; one may argue that 
the crisis-induced rise in the inflation rate was 4 percentage points. With about $6000 
billion reserves worldwide in 2008, the depreciation effect on reserves is $240 billion 
in that year; as regards the EU there are additional costs for the Community in the 
form of a fall of real output which is roughly 1 percentage points in 2009 compared to 
the business-as-usual scenario – to this effect of a fall in output of about $ 180 bill. 
one would have to add the drop in real output in other trading partners of the US. This 
is an international resource transfer in favor of the US amounting to about 2-3% of the 
rest of the world’s GDP), and this is more than the $300 billion the US taxpayer is 
likely to pay for the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac plus Lehman Brothers in 
2008/09. It could well be that the rest of the world will face higher costs from the US 
banking crisis than the US itself. The key players in the world economy will hardly be 
willing to accept a US-led financial globalization process if it turns out that it imposes 
major costs on non-US countries.  
•  The cost of achieving political consensus at the international level will affect the 
ability to cope with international crises. If there is a consistent mix of regional 
organizations (responsibilities) and global organizations, international frictions in 
running the global system will be relatively low. In this perspective, the EU principle 
of home country supervision for bank affiliates abroad – in other EU countries and the 
European Economic Space – is doubtful, as the ongoing internationalization of the 
intra-EU banking business means that national regulators face an increasingly tough 
challenge for effective regulation of banks. Moreover, banks from non-EU countries 
can easily set up a subsidiary in an EU country and subsequently engage in bank 
business in all EU countries through affiliates. If banks create a separate legal entity, a 
true subsidiary in another EU country, the host country’s supervisors will be 
responsible for supervision. However, this leaves a difficult moral hazard problem on 
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incentive to effectively supervise the subsidiary. If the subsidiary is in trouble, the 
parent bank in any case will have to foot the bill, and if not the parent bank then it will 
be the ministry of finance of the headquartering country. Creating colleges of 
supervisors – as suggested by the European Commission for big banks with 
international operations – is rather strange as well. A better system would follow the 
logic of regulations in telecommunications in the EU, that is, by establishing a 
supranational framework and making sure that national regulators have to adopt a 
combined legal and economic analysis while notifying key approaches to the 
European Commission which will produce a comparative report on prudential 
supervision in each EU country. National central banks – politically independent and 
not directly involved in monetary policy – should be involved in prudential 
supervision, and ideally, the national supervisory agency would have a similar 
institutional setup across the Euro zone countries. 
•  Effective crisis management in an international crisis of financial markets is crucial. It 
is rather doubtful that the world economy has an institutional platform for effective 
crisis management. The interplay between the BIS and the IMF is rather unclear; while 
the Bank of International Settlements has an analytical focus on world capital markets 
and also is home to the Basel Group of Supervisors; the BIS has an incomplete global 
coverage of (member) countries, while the IMF has no real competence in prudential 
supervision. It could have at least some reporting competence if the IMF statutes were 
changed in such a way as to require member countries to accept regular Financial 
Sector Assessment Programs, whose results would then be published. The OECD 
could also play a more important role, namely by conducting more research on 
financial market stability, prudential supervision and financial innovations. As regards 
the OECD reports of 2007/08, one may argue that there is neither much theoretical 
reflection nor can one identify a critical assessment of the USA (see the OECD’s 2007 
opaque country report on the USA). 
•  An international system can be sustainable only if there is acceptance of burden 
sharing. In other words, the costs of a major crisis must be shared in a way which is 
politically acceptable and gives no perverse incentives (e.g., for countries to ignore 
international external costs of domestic policy pitfalls). To some extent, one might 
argue that the IMF will be in charge of helping countries with high current account 
deficits and problems occurring in the context of massive exchange rate swings. 
However, the case of an international banking crisis has not really been defined within 
the mission of the IMF, although it seems to be logical that the organization which is 
in charge of maintaining the international payments system should have certain 
competences here as well. The IMF should create a special facility for helping 
countries which are subject to an external shock from a major banking crisis; the 
World Bank, which is engaged in financial institution building in developing 
countries, should offer particular support for very poor countries and help to convey 
best practice in prudential supervision, namely in the context of international 
benchmarking. 
•  Leadership in the global economy’s governance is crucial in the standard model of the 
international system dominated by a large economy – in the second half of the 20
th 
century, the USA was the dominant country and its share of world GDP was still close 
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st century; this is much above the 20% of the EU. 
Figures based on PPP look smaller for the USA, namely 20% (in 1929 the nominal 
share of the US in world GDP was 38%, but considering the fact that US multinational 
companies subsidiaries abroad are more important for GDP outside the US in 2008 
than in 1929 one may assume that the economic impact of the effective US economy 
has not reduced). However, with the rapid rise of China, there is no doubt that the 
exclusive leadership role of the US becomes less credible and legitimate over time. 
The alternative to a global system shaped by dominance would be one of joint 
leadership through an institutionalized policy club such as the G8 or the G20. Indeed, 
the meeting of the G20 in Washington in November 2008 suggests that the broader 
international G20 policy club is a feasible platform. The G20 policy club is relatively 
complex to organize since it has a relatively large number of member countries which 
have relatively heterogeneous characteristics. Given the fact that Chinese bankers – in 
Hong Kong and Shanghai (and in Singapore) – are quite experienced and influential, 
one will probably have to deal with certain global governance issues at the level of the 
G20 or a future G25 which should additionally include Spain. The G8/G20 is the 
group of policymakers which most likely will discuss the need for global reforms in 
prudential supervision. The IMF (STRAUSS-KAHN, 2008) also plays an important 
role. 
While the IMF effectively is in charge of designing a new architecture of the global financial 
system, it is not fully clear why more regulation in banking sectors is really needed. One may 
argue that the basic alternative is to engage in broad national or international dismemberment 
of big banks and thus to reinforce competition in the banking sector of each country 
(dismemberment could be realized after nationalization of banks: privatization gives an ideal 
starting point for splitting up banks which have exceeded a critical size); with smaller banks 
we have less problems of the too-big-to-fail type, and competition would therefore be 
relatively strong – and hence light regulation is appropriate. If, however, there is no 
dismemberment of big banks (and possibly insurance companies) in most countries, 
competition will be relatively weak and in this case stricter regulation is necessary. Strict 
regulation is the natural policy response to a system characterized by a few big banks, which 
are all too big to fail. In this perspective, the US government under President Bush pursued an 
inconsistent policy: Bank mergers had brought about a system of Wall Street banks which 
were too big to fail, and at the same time, the government was not eager to implement strict 
regulation.  
It is noteworthy that the biggest US banks – by size of assets – were not the most profitable 
(see appendix 7). Thus, the dismemberment of banks might be considered as part of structural 
reforms in the banking sector. This, however, does not rule out that big banks nevertheless 
might have a critical function for the economy, for example in terms of innovation dynamics 
(in the banking sector or in other sectors), so that one has to carefully look into the issue of 
dismemberment of banks. One also cannot advocate a general expansion of regulation; for 
banks facing sustained competition and facing high transparency standards in terms of 
financial disclosure and balance-sheets, respectively, there is no need for strong regulation.  
 
 
  214.  Global and EU Policy Options 
The international banking crisis started in the US, whose banking market has dominated the 
international developments for decades – sometimes joined by British banks which benefitted 
from deregulation in the 1980s. While the internationalization of banking intensified in the 
1990s – in Europe through the creation of the EU single market in 1992 – the world’s leading 
economy, the US, has allowed effective regulation to weaken over time; the personnel for risk 
management in the USSEC declined dramatically under the Bush administration, surprisingly 
in a period in which the investment banks for which the USSEC is the relevant supervisor 
expanded heavily. The FED has held the view – under Greenspan and also under Bernanke – 
that reducing regulation should be the appropriate policy approach for traditional banks (bank 
holdings). The result has been insufficient equity capital for the growing risks taken by big 
banks in New York. Some of the Wall Street Investment banks were major players in the 
subprime mortgage market. There were also some banks from the UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands and France as well as Switzerland active in that market. As regards Germany, 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank and SachsenLB were among the large players in the US markets; 
the absolute volume of subprime deals represented by these two medium-size German banks 
was larger than that of the German leader, Deutsche Bank. The IKB had no clear idea of the 
type of business it was undertaking; indeed, on its website it explained the role of special 
investment vehicles and it claimed that investment in ABS are “in the short run an almost 
risk-free investment” (see appendix 4). In its 2006 annual report, IKB claimed that it had 
adopted a conservative strategy in the field of risk – one may argue that this is a 
straightforward lie. Interestingly, faulty statements in company reports are not liable. From 
this perspective, a key element of EU reforms should be to require company statements in the 
annual reports to incur a specific liability if key statements are wrong – statements about the 
risk strategy should be earmarked as being of particular sensitivity, and it would be useful to 
develop a new indicator system by which one could measure the degree of risk incurred. A 
new EU directive is urgent here and it is obvious that intra-EU capital flows are distorted by 
misleading statements of bankers with respect to risk and risk management, respectively. One 
also should note that the EU single banking market will be distorted by asymmetric 
government-led bank recapitalization in individual member countries; here the European 
Commission has an important task in pushing for common principles for recapitalization of 
banks. 
As regards cooperation between the EU and the US, it would be useful to establish a 
transatlantic and global parliamentary debate on financial globalization. The Bank of 
International Settlements should become the core of enhanced financial regulation in a global 
context: This will require broadening membership on the one hand. On the other hand, the 
BIS should be subject to special international parliamentary control. Selected members of the 
European Parliament, the US House, and other parliaments should be delegates of a newly 
established Parliamentary Assembly at BIS. The OECD Development Centre also could be 
used as a forum for a policy debate involving industrialized countries, Brazil, China and other 
newly industrialized countries). Thus the pressure on the BIS to come up with better and more 
consistent work could be reinforced, and this would reinforce global governance. The IMF 
will have a crucial role for stabilizing countries facing sudden strong capital outflows and 
hence high devaluations; a particular problem will occur in countries with high foreign debt. 
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decline of the real economy could overlap with a second wave of the banking crisis and high 
capital outflows or reduced capital inflows. Individual EU countries as well as the 
Community should help eastern European accession countries. As regards Island – a country 
in the European Economic Space – the EU should also help the country since there is a global 
fragility which implies that bankruptcy of any country in Europe would be a signal for 
investors worldwide that countries in Europe could indeed go bankrupt: Country risk premia 
would increase while the US would benefit in such a situation from higher capital inflows 
driven by save-heaven considerations (appendix 1 presents theoretical reflections which 
highlight the impact of financial market integration and changes in risk premia, respectively). 
As regards the euro zone one may emphasize that membership of the euro zone is quite useful 
for some Mediterranean countries; without the euro zone and ECB all EU countries would be 
part of the European Monetary System (EMS I) and there is no doubt that the international 
banking crisis would have created enormous tensions on the continent – with Greece, Italy 
and Portugal being among the prime targets for speculative attacks. 
As regards the EU one may conclude that the best way to reform the system of prudential 
supervision is to combine stricter national regulations with a new EU-based complementary 
framework on prudential supervision. There are good arguments why an integrated financial 
EU market requires European supervision to some extent (PRIESEMANN, 1997; WELFENS, 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008a, 2008b; WOLF, 2007). If the UK should be reluctant to support 
an EU-wide framework regulation of financial markets, the euro zone countries should 
undertake their own policy initiative. It should be possible to create a euro zone-wide 
regulatory framework quickly, namely through a treaty among central banks of member 
countries of the euro zone; this would be in line with the creation of the European Monetary 
System in 1979 when heads of states were skeptical that a traditional international treaty – 
requiring ratification in parliaments of all EU member countries – could work. Thus, the EMS 
was created on the basis of a treaty among EU central banks.  
Better regulation is required to overcome the banking crisis of 2007/08 (which could be 
reinforced by a global recession in 2009). Several principles should be emphasized here as 
elements of a solution: 
•  Typical remedies for coping with the market for lemons problem considered in the 
relevant goods market (e.g., used automobiles) should also be applied in the interbank 
market. Guarantees or warranties are one element, carefully building up reputation a 
second, while conveying quality signals are a third aspect. One should note that a 
quality control system can be developed by the banking industry itself, it is not really 
necessary for government to do this; rather government could encourage banks to 
develop quality signals, guarantee schemes, etc. 
•  A useful new rule should stipulate that banks creating an ABS or similar financial 
papers must declare that they will be willing to buy back the assets at any point of time 
for no less than 50% of the initial market price. Such a clause would avoid 
uncertainties about valuation in an economic crisis. At the same time banks, would 
have a strong incentive to carefully consider the creation of markets and the range of 
partners involved in ABS transactions. Banks launching ABS should maintain a 20% 
stake in the equity tranche so that the respective banks have a strong motivation to 
carefully consider the risks involved in loan portfolios and securitization. (The 
German Minister of Finance has also advocated for such a 20% rule.) 
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packages and guarantee schemes implemented by many OECD countries are a rather 
artificial way to jump-start the interbank markets. The rescue packages of September 
and October 2008 could be useful to some extent and are indeed helpful in creating 
some extra time to come up with truly adequate reform initiatives. However, it will be 
necessary to give incentives to banks to become more active again in the interbank 
market. The ECB should give preferential interest rates for access to central bank 
liquidity to those banks which are active in the interbank market; banks which are 
more active in the medium term should have more favorable access than banks which 
are mainly in the short term interbank market.  
•  As creating trust among banks is quite difficult, it could be useful to encourage the 
creation of small homogenous groups of banks which are willing to resume interbank 
lending. Such arrangements could indeed be encouraged both by central banks and the 
ECB. In a second step the regional clubs of banks could be merged in order to create a 
euro zone-wide banking community which is active in the interbank markets. 
There is some risk that the global G20 deliberations will lead to discussions about a very long 
list of reform steps which are difficult to implement and which effectively create more 
confusion than progress in solving the critical problems. A very long and complex list of 
measures invites external pressure for delaying the process through confusing and complex 
debates. Thus, setting priorities is quite important, and five priorities have been highlighted 
here. A new regulatory approach in financial markets should follow the successful example of 
telecommunications markets; benchmarking, EU regulatory reviews and an ongoing dialogue 
with scientific experts are indispensible elements. The European Parliament should restore the 
EP’s research service (former DG-IV of the EP), which is quite crucial for optimal legislation 
in an increasingly complex world economy. 
If the US should fail to adopt Basel II rules – plus some additional key regulations for banks, 
hedge funds and insurance companies –, the EU should consider imposing restrictions on 
transatlantic capital flows. It is not in the interest of the EU (nor of the world economy) that in 
the context of uneven regulatory conditions for banks, insurance companies and the like, 
capital from the EU flows to the US with its partly artificially high rates of return on equity. 
At least in the run-up to the banking crisis, many banks and other financial companies 
enjoyed a cost-advantage by not having to comply with Basel II rules. A US system which has 
neither consistent domestic regulation nor Basel II rules is creating negative external effects 
through the chaos the US banking crisis of 2007/08 has created in international financial 
markets. This is neither a level playing field nor a system in line with basic requirements for 
efficiency and stability. One should note that imposing capital export taxes on investments of 
EU firms with realized plans for portfolio investment in the US simply reflects a type of 
PIGOU tax which is designed to help internalize negative external (international) effects. It is 
up to the US to avoid such effective barriers for international capital flows. 
The EU should push for the creation of a formal Group of International Supervisors (GIS), 
which would become a twin organization to the existing BIS. The GIS should include 
supervisors from all countries of the world and be mainly organized in regional groupings 
(e.g., EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN). The BIS/GIS should be subject to direct 
international parliamentary control in order to avoid bureaucratic inefficiencies and lack of 
transparency. 
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along with the World Bank and WTO. In such a manner, one could look more deeply into the 
interdependencies of setting international rules for the world economy. One could thereby 
create a more consistent international division of labor across international organizations. 
Thus we can summarize the overall analysis as follows. The diagnostic part of the US banking 
crisis is obvious: (1) The optimum (national) size of banks grows along with the volume of 
global financial markets; the rapid expansion and internationalization of financial markets 
after 1991 increased the size of banks and insurance companies in the US as well as in 
Europe. (2) Once certain banks and insurance companies obtained critical size, the potential 
risk of bankruptcy for each represents a systemic risk. The managers of these banks and 
insurance companies can then pursue strategies of excessive risk-taking in the context of 
chasing higher expected rates of return on equity – those managers can bet on a bail-out 
through the government in the case of bankruptcy, and therefore the competition process is 
seriously weakened. For example, as long as the bank was not on the brink of bankruptcy, the 
investment bank Goldman Sachs could pay its 26,000 employees $16 billion in bonus 
payments during 2006. Raising the required rate of return on equity to 25% at the beginning 
of the 21
st century set in Wall Street – and in other OECD banking centers – an illusionary 
target, which testifies to the ignorance of top managers about firmly-established laws in 
Economics. With a 4% rate of return on risk-free government bonds, the target ratio of 25% 
implied a risk premium of 21% and hence implied furthermore that bankers were chasing very 
risky deals. (3) In the case of a banking crisis, major banks can obviously blackmail 
government and prudential authorities to impose a ban on short sales of banking stocks. In the 
US, Secretary of the Treasury Paulson imposed such a ban in September 2008 (possibly after 
a call from the boss of Morgan Stanley). (4) While it is true that the US administration did not 
bail out Lehman Brothers – it filed for protection under chapter 11 –, no big bank or insurance 
company faces a credible threat of bankruptcy as there is a visible “too-big-to-fail problem.” 
Thus, competition in the banking sector is weakened; and in other sectors linked to the 
banking system directly (eg the US automotive firms and their respective banks which 
represent themselves high stocks of asset-backed securities/ABS, collateralized debt 
oligations/CDOs – a mixture of various ABS - and credit default swaps/CDS which are a kind 
of insurance for loan packages). The government’s bail out of the big insurance company, 
AIG, provides more evidence of this problem; indeed, it had to be saved once Lehman 
Brothers was pushed towards chapter 11, because AIG sits on an enormous stock of credit 
default swaps, including those which cover part of the claims against Lehman Brothers. AIG 
also had to be saved, because its high stock of CDS would have been worthless once AIG had 
gone bankrupt. As CDS provides coverage against “failure of bonds/loans packaged in ABS,” 
it is clear that enormous depreciation on portfolios in many banks and insurance companies 
would have been triggered once CDS of AIGs had become worthless. It is noteworthy that 
CDS and credit derivatives were sold worldwide at the beginning of the 21
st century. For 
example, even Allianz probably had about €1,000 billion of CDS on its books at the end of 
2007. As there is no global inventory list on CDS, it is absolutely unclear which countries – 
and to what extent – are infected through toxic CDS. This, in turn, reinforces the lack of 
confidence in financial markets in general and in interbank markets in particular. (5) At the 
bottom line the big banks, big funds and big insurance companies are in a situation coined in a 
phrase by Janos Kornai – there is “soft budget constraint”, as government bail-out is fully 
anticipated for the case that anything goes seriously wrong (Kornai’s soft budget constraint 
originally referred to socialist countries where central banks had to ratify whatever overruns 
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of these companies, there are poor incentives for good governance. Moreover, the incentive to 
take excessive risks is strong. It is strange that the phenomenon of the soft budget constraint 
once used by Kornai to discuss the notorious inefficiency of socialist command economies 
must now be discussed in the context of the 2007/08 crisis of the US financial system. (6) The 
work of rating agencies has been poor and implies that financial market actors suffer from 
opaque signalling in bonds markets. (7) From the above list of problems and weaknesses, the 
necessary remedies for coping with the crisis and for avoiding future crises can be derived. 
The world economy needs competitive and efficient banks acting within a more long-term 
framework of open competitive markets. 
Government bail-outs of major US banks and US insurance companies – or nationalization – 
is only one element of solving the crisis where we assume that those firms will be restructured 
and privatized in the long run. Other necessary reform elements are: a) restrictions on the size 
of banks and insurance companies – and even dismemberment of oversized firms which 
exhibit the “too-big-to-fail problem”; in the absence of dismemberment stricter regulation is 
absolutely necessary. Insurance companies with standard insurance business should not be 
allowed to be active in the CDS market and related fields, as this pillar of potentially very 
large risks could easily undermine the stability of the respective insurance companies; b) 
taxing banks, funds and insurance companies on the basis of both profits and volatility of 
rates of return (the higher the volatility, the higher the tax rate), so that the apparently short-
term bonus/profit maximization strategies no longer look attractive; banks which sell asset-
backed securities must keep 20% on their books and guarantee that they will buy back the 
assets sold for at least ½ of the selling price; c) the large US rating agencies which 
represented – according to an SEC Report – such visible lack of proficiency should become 
subject to a licensing procedure while imposing random testing of the quality of rating 
projects; a group of experts should conduct regular testing, and at the same time, high fines 
must be imposed for faulty ratings and insufficient documentation of rating decision-making; 
d) comprehensive regulations for banks and hedge funds as well as related actors in financial 
markets are needed, and prudential supervisory bodies should be more professionally 
organized in terms of research and a scientific advisory body (Germany’s BaFin is a relevant, 
weak example in this field, and it should indeed be reorganized); e) all CDS contracts should 
be registered in a global database, and regulators should adopt broad requirements in terms of 
transparency, on the one hand, and restrictions, on the other; for example, CDS contracts 
should not be accumulated by banks or insurance companies on a large scale, which 
effectively implies that they would no longer face any threat of bankruptcy (since they signify 
a systemic risk in case of bankruptcy); f) rating agencies will no longer obtain fees directly 
from the issuing of bonds; instead, there should be a two-stage pool financing, according to 
which rating firms obtain fees only from a large pool within which all companies issuing 
bonds should contribute; g) as regards prudential supervision, a Europeanization of the 
process is advisable to make sure that crisis management in the EU single financial market 
can be organized effectively; there is also a need to somewhat restrict regulatory arbitrage 
within the EU. 
These minimum reform agendas for the USA – and also for the EU – should not be 
understood as simply reflecting a new policy fad with a bias in favour of regulation and 
control. Rather, this agenda is the logical response to the problem of a soft budget constraint 
on the part of the banking and insurance sector in OECD countries; too-big-to-fail has become 
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justified by referring to arguments by COOTER/SCHAEFER (2008), who discuss the role of 
regulation for the specific case of (developing) countries with weak rule-of-law. With such a 
weakness, it is quite useful to have regulations as a kind of general remedy. In the US and the 
EU, one should realistically consider that the soft budget constraint of big banks and big 
insurance companies is an important problem and that market discipline and competition 
forces are often rather weak. Hence tighter regulations – and, in some cases, dismemberment 
of companies – are preferred policy options for coping with the problem of too-big-to-fail. It 
is noteworthy that ongoing financial market globalization will reinforce the tendency for a 
growing role of big banks and big insurance companies. Such growth dynamics are only 
acceptable by policymakers if there are strict regulation or remedies in favor of more 
competition (e.g., a fall of sunk costs and hence a greater likelihood of newcomers entering 
the market). The visible tendency of the US to internationally externalize a considerable share 
of the costs of its banking crisis makes reforms urgent, which helps to internalize negative 
external effects. It is not implausible to assume that the rest of the world bears a larger share 
of the costs of the US banking crisis than the US itself.  
Without better regulations or more competition in the banking sector – as well as better 
prudential supervision, which should follow a more economic approach as compared to the 
largely legalistic approach traditionally applied –, no internationalization of the EU C02 
emission certificate markets should take place. Similarly, there could also be no feasible 
pension reforms in Europe which would encourage individuals to embark more on private 
retirement savings. The apparent knowledge gap of bankers in some big banks suggest that 
compulsory retraining of managers would be useful; as much as retraining among medical 
doctors is standard, there is an equal need to make sure managers understand through teaching 
units – provided by independent universities and institutes – the challenges they face. Moral 
hazard remains a big problem. 
The ECB should exploit opportunities for reducing the interest rate. Such a step is unlikely to 
directly stimulate economic expansion, but it would reinforce profitability of banks in the 
euro zone which face considerable problems with respect to profitability (see appendix 2 for 
regressions on banks’ profitability in the US, Switzerland, Germany, the UK and the EU, 
respectively). Banks in the euro zone will welcome profits from intermediation in a situation 
where high depreciations on portfolios of banks are common. With lower short term interest 
rates it could be possible to avoid an inverse yield structure; such a yield structure already has 
been observed in the US where save-heaven effects have channeled a high share of savings 
and capital inflows into long term government bonds. Profitability of banks is a key for 
revitalizing the banks’ loan business in the medium and long run. 
The EU would be wise to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy in 2009, namely in a situation in 
which monetary policy has lost its effectiveness (partly because banks hardly pass on the 
ECB’s reduction of the central bank interest rate to the banks’ clients; problems with the 
Keynesian liquidity trap could also play a role). Many countries simultaneously face a 
recession, and the recession could be unusually deep judging by forecasts of the IMF, the EU 
and the Deutsche Bundesbank in November 2008. In such a situation one should consider 
options for expansionary fiscal policy with a clear focus on stimulating innovation and 
investments; in some countries, measures to stimulate consumption could also be adequate. 
The EU countries should spend more money on improving infrastructure. This should include 
modern telecommunications, and here it would be quite useful for the European Commission 
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enhance cooperation with the new US administration; on both sides of the Atlantic, an 
expansionary fiscal policy with a strong focus on green IT could be useful. The new US 
administration will consider climate policy as a more important field than the Bush 
administration has, falling more in line with the EU countries’ year-long emphasis on fighting 
global warming. Thus it seems attractive to consider a joint expansionary policy with a triple 
focus on green IT, infrastructure modernization and selected impulses for higher innovation 
and investment. At the bottom line, it should be emphasized that restoring confidence in the 
interbank market is of paramount importance for overcoming the US and global crisis.    
As regards sustainable long term rates of return in industry OECD countries have shown that 
about 16% can be considered as a normal gross rate of return (see appendix 6); assuming a 
capital depreciation rate of 10% one may argue that Schumpeterian innovation rents of 
investors in industry reflect hard earned risk premiums. Thus there are few arguments why 
banks should be able to fetch much higher gross rates of return without incurring much higher 
risks. If hedge funds remain unregulated there is, however, a potential stimulus for a new 
wave of illusory yield expectations in financial markets. From a policy perspective the 
negative national and international external effects associated with behavior of unregulated 
hedge funds and big banks calls for a PIGOU tax or, alternatively, regulations which help to 
avoid negative external effects. 
Once the banking crisis translates into a massive recession, one may expect a rapid rise in the 
unemployment rate in the US and the UK where labor markets are rather unregulated 
(ADDISON/WELFENS, 2003; 2009). As yields on investment of many US and British 
pension funds have fallen dramatically in 2008/09, there will be an unusual labor supply 
effect among the elderly which could translate into a modest rise in national output – provided 
that wages are sufficiently flexible. In the euro zone, the rise in unemployment rates among 
member countries could be considerable once firms can no longer rely on the instrument of 
transitory reduced working hours, which are an option in all EU countries.  
From an EU perspective, a serious challenge is faced in eastern European accession countries. 
People in those countries which are not a member of the euro zone face high depreciation 
rates of the currency, as safe heaven aspects drive many international investors to pull out of 
eastern Europe. The effect of the devaluation is a rise in foreign indebtedness and thus the 
problem looks somewhat similar to the Asian crisis of 1997/98. Beyond the currency 
mismatch there also is the problem of maturity mismatch – partly in the banking sector, partly 
in industry. While labor market flexibility in eastern Europe partly is below that of ASEAN 
countries, one may nevertheless recall some key findings for labor markets dynamics in the 
Asian crisis (FALLON/LUCAS, 2002): Employment fell less than output, countries with 
sharp depreciations faced high real wage rate cuts which in turn dampened the rise in 
unemployment rates. The fall of the real exchange rate should lead to a medium term rise in 
foreign direct investment if one follows the FROOT-STEIN argument who have argued that a 
real depreciation will stimulate foreign direct investment, namely in the context of imperfect 
capital markets. However, the transatlantic banking crisis raises specific concerns, namely 
that lack of bank capital in EU15 countries which were major investors in banking sectors of 
accession countries could undermine the viability of financial markets in eastern Europe. 
Whether expansionary fiscal policy in OECD countries will be an adequate policy response 
remains to be seen. New Keynesian Models might not give an adequate answer to the issues at 
hand, since NKM assumes a given steady state output trajectory. However, the financial 
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unemployment rate.  
There are few doubts that part of the original crisis dynamics in the US are linked to the high 
US current account deficit which was not sustainable. The high current account deficit was 
financed through high net US capital imports, partly based on expected rates of returns which 
were illusory (and tilted also by fraud of the type visible in the Madoff Ponzi scheme). High 
current account surpluses of Germany, Japan, China, Switzerland and several resource 
exporters were the mirror of the high US current account deficit. To the extent that the US 
banking crisis and the global recession signal that the previous economic pattern of 
international resource allocation – including the high US current account deficit – is not 
sustainable, there are new challenges for countries with a structural surplus in the current 
account. If the US savings rate should increase in the medium term, surplus countries such as 
Germany, China and Japan will face declining export growth. From this perspective, fiscal 
policy packages in these countries should consider a specific focus on the expansion of the 
nontradables sector, that is measures which raise the relative price of nontradable products. 
The medium term structure of employment in terms of the breakdown nontradables/tradables 
will have to adjust accordingly. In countries which are considered structural net exporters, 
fiscal stimulus packages should thus contain elements which reinforce expansion of the 
nontradables sector – for example, there could be specific measures in favor of an expansion 
of the health care sector, the education sector and construction activities. Such measures 
should help to raise the price of nontradables relative to that of tradables; thus production in 
the tradables sector would decline and net exports reduce. As regards the fiscal stimulus 
packages in structural net exporter countries, there is insufficient focus on the nontradables 
sector. At the bottom line, one may emphasize that the task of restoring a functional banking 
sector cannot be substituted fiscal policy packages. Thus, structural reforms are indispensible. 
In the epilogue The Age of Turbulence, Alan Greenspan (GREENSPAN, 2008, p. 522) argues 
that the underpricing of risk observed in the US in the bubble had to collide with innate 
human risk-aversion. This implies that the FED had recognized the problem, particularly that 
the situation was not sustainable. More interestingly, GREENSPAN (2008, p. 523) states: 
“But I am also increasingly persuaded that governments and central bank could not have 
importantly altered the course of the boom either. To do so, they have had to induce a degree 
of economic contraction sufficient to nip the budding euphoria. I have seen no evidence, 
however, that electorates in modern democratic societies would tolerate such severity in 
macroeconomic policy to combat a problem that might not even materialize.” This view is 
strange and if applied to pilots steering an airplane, clearly ill-founded. If pilots note that they 
have different indicators on their flight instruments before take-off, they would not even be 
allowed to take-off and if such problems occur during flight – showing anomalies with respect 
to parameters - they have to consider an emergency landing. If bankers want to pursue 
financial engineering, we need to apply the rigorous testing and standard-setting of engineers, 
not the chaotic innovation system organized on Wall Street. From a Rawlsian perspective, it 
also seems clear that voters would rather have liked the FED to avoid an excessive boom and 
the following economic collapse – such as the situation of 1928/29 in the US (followed by a 
cumulative fall of output by 27%), not to mention 2005/06. Central banks which recognize 
underpricing of risk to occur over more than one year should be mandated by law to take steps 
to correct the market anomalies. Imposing capital export controls should be considered a 
legitimate policy option of countries whose central banks have identified sustained 
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taken steps to correct the market anomaly. Globalization can be a long term success story, but 
financial globalization without consistent rules is dangerous. Better democratic control of 
globalization is needed. 
Beyond reform requirements for a more stable and efficient international financial system, 
one may raise three questions: 
•  Which economic development of the world economy would one have witnessed if the 
underpricing of risk and the institutional deficiencies of OECD financial markets 
would had been avoided? The basic hypothesis here is that economic growth would 
have been lower in the world economy, volatility of asset prices lower and the rise in 
unemployment in the global economy would have been largely avoided. 
•  Why is the market economy so weak in establishing responsibilities in the financial 
market system? Probably because it is quite complex and because “big banks” are so 
well connected to parties and the political system that the pressure to cover up 
responsibilities is enormous. Economists who have learned that one has to distinguish 
allocation via markets and via alternative institutions (e.g., hierarchies, political voting 
systems) should be alarmed when bankers coin a word such as “distressed markets.” 
Those who are active in financial markets and launch financial product innovations are 
responsible for markets that work. No financial innovation should be launched in any 
country without prior testing and careful simulation analysis. Governments and 
international institutions – the latter associated with independent research institutes – 
should present regular analysis on international financial market developments. A 
situation in which almost all OECD member countries have been analyzed by the 
OECD under the heading of Financial Sector Assessment Program – while the largest 
OECD country, the US, has not – is unacceptable and should not have been tolerated 
by EU countries. External effects of the US system probably are a problem (see 
appendix) 
•  Economists have to develop better macro models – which must include an explicit 
banking system – if Economics as a science does not want to suffer a serious blow to 
its reputation. The inability of major macro forecasters to understand in late 2007 that 
a serious US banking crisis would have negative international spillovers and in the end 
would have negative real effects is disappointing and suggests that too many model-
builders ignore even the most basic links between the monetary economy and the real 
economy. New Keynesian Macroeconomics which largely puts the focus on the 
deviation from an exogenous, long-term equilibrium is doubtful to the extent that the 
financial market crisis will undermine the existing long run equilibrium.   
As regards policy makers, there are new key issues for monetary policy. In the US there might 
be quantitative easing – the FED would acquire large amounts of bonds held by banks – 
which, however, are likely to bring a devaluation of the US dollar; the devaluation reflects 
fear of future inflation (this does not rule out short-term deflationary impulses in the context 
of a global recession). The higher the expected devaluation rate of the US $, the lower US 
portfolio inflows will be and this in turn could put pressure on the FED to raise interest rates 
in the medium term. Moreover, the more toxic assets the FED buys from big banks, the more 
those banks might be tempted to embark on a new expansion wave of securitization. If this 
should take place under unchanged institutional rules, a new stock of toxic assets will be 
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the ECB avoid embarking strongly on a path of quantitative easing. In the EU, one conclusion 
could be that the euro zone can cope more successfully with the international banking crisis 
than the UK and other non-euro EU member countries. At the same time, there is some risk 
that instabilities in eastern Europe could put additional pressure on both the European 
Commission and the ECB. 
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  34Appendix 1: Theoretical Analysis - Modified Branson Model and 
the Banking Crisis 
Financial market globalization is related to regional monetary integration – see particularly 
the case of the euro zone – and to financial product innovations, which amounts to raising the 
marginal utility of financial instruments. In integrated markets, the fixed costs of financial 
innovations could be more easily spread across world markets than in a world economy with 
fragmented markets. Hence integrated financial markets should generate a higher rate of 
product innovations. At the same time, one may emphasize that the financial market crisis of 
2007/08 amounts to some transatlantic disintegration of both financial markets and banking 
services, not least since EU banks’ subsidiaries in the US could no longer get refinancing in 
the US in 2007 – to some extent this could be considered discrimination against EU banks in 
the US. (Since December 2007, transatlantic swap agreements between the FED and the ECB 
had to make sure that European banks could get sufficient dollar liquidity. The FED gives a 
US$ loan to the ECB, which thus can give a dollar loan to big EU banks – with a subsidiary in 
the US. The European bank’s respective headquarters then gives a US$ loan to its subsidiary 
in the US.) 
The Branson model is a useful analytical starting point to understand some of the key aspects 
of financial market integration and disintegration. The model determines the nominal interest 
rate i and the nominal exchange rate e – denoted here in price notation – in a system of 
flexible exchange rates. It is a short-term model with three assets, namely (short-term) 
domestic bonds whose stock is B; money M and foreign bonds F (denominated in foreign 
currency). The desired share of each asset in total wealth (real wealth is A’) is denoted as b, n 
and f, respectively, and each asset demand is assumed to be proportionate A’. We can thus 
state the equilibrium conditions for money market, the domestic bonds market and the foreign 
bonds market as follows (i*’ denotes the sum of the exogenous foreign interest rate i* and the 
exogenous expected depreciation rate a
E): 
(1)  M/P = n(i,i*’)A’  MM curve 
(2)  B/P = b(i,i*’)A’  BB curve 
(3)  eF/P = f(i,i*’)A’  FF curve 
(4)  A’= M/P + B/P + eF/P 
The budget constraint (4) implies that only two of the three equations are independent. As n 
and f are a negative function of i, while b is a positive function of i, the MM curve has a 
positive slope in e-i-space. The BB curve and the FF curve have a negative slope, but the FF 
curve is steeper than the BB curve. B, F and M are given in the short run. F will increase if 
there is a current account surplus; B will increase if there is a budget deficit. For simplicity, 
one may assume that we initially have neither a budget deficit nor a current account deficit. In 
the medium term the current account will react to a change in the real exchange rate. (As the 
price level at home and abroad is assumed to be constant, we can consider changes in the 
nominal exchange rate as a change in the real exchange rate.) Here we emphasize that a 
change of the exogenous variables will shift the BB curve or the FF curve or the MM curve; 
in some cases all curves will shift. If we consider an expansionary open market policy (dM= -
dB: thus real wealth is not changing in the short term), the MM curve does not shifting, but 
  35the BB curve shifts to the left. The short-term reaction is a depreciation and a fall in the 
interest rate (see point E1), which brings about a medium term improvement of the current 
account as exports of goods will increase and imports will decline as a consequence of the rise 
in the exchange rate. This in turn will cause a downward shift of the FF curve (this current 
account effect is neglected in the traditional Branson model), so that the FF line runs through 
the intersection of the BB1 curve and the MM0 curve. Note also that the diagram b) contains 
an additional MNI curve which indicates monetary neutrality in the sense that – following the 
logic of the monetary condition index – a real depreciation and a fall in the real interest rate 
are expansionary with respect to real GDP. Point E1 is above the line for the monetary 
neutrality index (MNI0 line which has a negative slope) and thus real income increases. With 
a given capital stock K the implication is that average capital productivity will increase, and if 
we consider a Cobb-Douglas production function it is clear that the marginal product of 
capital has also increased, which in turn stimulates investment and will increase both the real 
interest rate r and the nominal interest rate i. We leave it open here how the long run 
adjustment will be, but one may emphasize that even economic growth can be considered in a 
modified Branson model (WELFENS, 2008c).  
 
Figure 3:  Branson Model (a) and Expansionary Open Market Policy (b) 
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Next we consider a fall in the foreign interest rate. The leftward shift of the BB curve is given 
by –bi*/bi (bi* and bi denote the partial derivative of b with respect to i and i*, respectively) 
and thus becomes stronger with increased financial market integration, as bi* will rises in 
absolute terms through integration. The leftward shift of the FF curve is indicated by fi*/fi, and 
as financial market integration implies that fi will rise in absolute terms, the leftward shift of 
the FF curve is smaller under strong integration than under weak integration. Thus the 
following graph with case b) is more typical for the case of international financial market 
integration than case a): a fall in the foreign interest rate will thus entail a fall in the interest 
rate. 
  36Figure 4:  Effects of a Fall of the Foreign Interest Rate under Weak (a) and Strong 
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There is an additional aspect of financial market integration that has to be considered, namely 
changes in the slope of the curves. With more intensive financial market integration – 
implying that a larger range of liquid (substitutes for money) assets becomes available – the 
MM curve becomes steeper. The slope of the MM curve can be expressed as –eEn,i/(fi), where 
E with two subscripts denotes elasticities. The FF curve also becomes steeper with enhanced 
financial market integration (read: there is a rise of Ef,i in absolute terms). As we can see, the 
main effect here is a depreciation of the currency. The intersection of the BB0 and the MM1 
curve in point H is a depreciation which improves the current account so that the FF1 curve 
shifts downwards and goes through E2 (the FF2 curve is not shown in the subsequent graph 
a)). 
































The international banking crisis of 2007/08 implies a disintegration of financial markets and 
thus should bring about a rise in the nominal interest rate. Moreover, we can consider the role 
of a risk premium which has visibly emerged in 2008 – after a strange period 2003-06 in 
which the risk premia in US markets declined. Let us assume that B represents only 
government bonds and F are foreign bonds (could include bonds placed by foreign 
multinational companies). In a period of high market turbulence and a rising risk premium, 
we may consider the following modified model where Ω denotes risk premium: 
(1)  M/P = n(i,i*’, Ω)A’ MM  curve 
(2)  B/P = b(i,i*’, Ω)A’ BB  curve 
(3)  eF/P = f(i,i*’, Ω)A’ FF  curve 
The demand for money is a positive function of the risk premium, and the demand for 
domestic government bonds is also a positive function of Ω; hence the MM curve shifts 
downwards and the BB curve to the left. The demand for foreign bonds declines if the 
exogenous Ω increases and hence we get a leftward shift of the FF curve (FF2 instead of FF1): 
a fall of e implies that there is a negative net supply effect (gross supply eF minus induced 
demand from the change of e which related to A’). The higher risk premium thus brings about 
a nominal – and real appreciation. Taking the US as the relevant country to be considered, one 
may argue that the $ appreciation in the autumn 2008 can thus be explained. There is a caveat 
in that the US represents a large economy and therefore a two country model would be more 
appropriate than the simple approach presented here. However, the qualitative results would 
not really change in a two country model. For all countries with high foreign debt – 
denominated in US$ – this implies additional problems, as foreign debt expressed in domestic 
currency will rise. 
  38Appendix 2: Regresssion Results for Banks’ Profits 
The following analysis looks at the profits of banks in the period 1980-2007 (annual data). To 
the extent that there are no lags of endogenous variables, we use the Durbin Watson test to 
check for auto-correlation. If there are lags of endogenous variables to be considered, we use 
the relevant Ljung-Box Q-statistics. A straightforward hypothesis is to assume that profits are 
negatively influenced by the central bank interest rate and the interest structure (three month 
interest rate/long term rate: this ratio indicates the profit potential from intermediation); in like 
manner, profits should positively depend on stock market volumes and nominal GDP. As 
regards Switzerland, the central bank rate has a significant negative impact, but the interest 
rate structure has a positive sign; the adjusted R2 (0.56) is relatively high. For the UK, it is 
rather difficult to find a good fit, as stock market volumes are neither significant on a current 
basis nor on the basis of lags. As regards the US, the equation with the two variables discount 
rate and GDP presents a good fit and R2 is 0.82. In the case of Germany, we have two 
relevant variables, namely the discount rate and the interest rate structure – both with the 
theoretically correct sign; also the stock market volume is significant. For the EU15, the 
equation shows a relatively low R2, the stock market volume positively affects profits, and 
the discount rate has a negative impact on profits. The EU15 equation might be blurred by 
exchange rate changes which could particularly affect figures for the UK. If the banking 




Dependent Variable: DBG Switzerland
Included observations: 17 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1,898177 1,412786 0,1831
DDISCR(-1) -2,065266 -2,387576 0,0343
DGDP 0,744485 2,360272 0,036
DIR_RATIO 7,366168 2,216426 0,0467
DSMV -0,010434 -1,334539 0,2068
R-squared 0,667601
Adjusted R-squared 0,556801  
 
Dependent Variable: DBG UK
Included observations: 16 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
DIR_RATIO 67,21117 1,504203 0,1584
DIR_RATIO(-1) -68,26024 -1,511647 0,1565
DSMV 0,207897 0,246016 0,8098
DSMV(-1) 0,71439 0,777999 0,4516
R-squared 0,322577
Adjusted R-squared 0,153221  
 
  39Dependent Variable: DBG US
Included observations: 17 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
DDISCR -1,102426 -1,939272 0,0715
DGDP 1,174455 9,029179 0
R-squared 0,834837
Adjusted R-squared 0,823826
Durbin-Watson stat 2,250786  
 
Dependent Variable: DBG EU15
Included observations: 17 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 2,14516 1,353922 0,1972
DDISCR(-1) -2,048125 -2,452928 0,0279
DSMV 0,2099 1,920008 0,0755
R-squared 0,341618
Adjusted R-squared 0,247563  
 
Dependent Variable: DBG GER
Included observations: 17 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 13,95844 2,742814 0,0168
DISCR -2,167209 -1,938802 0,0745
DIR_RATIO -50,72781 -4,416443 0,0007
DSMV 0,16535 3,570429 0,0034
R-squared 0,707515
Adjusted R-squared 0,640019
Durbin-Watson stat 1,781588  
Definition of variables: 
D: differentiated variable (first time difference) 
DBG: bank profits (first difference) 
DISCR: discount rate (central bank rate) 
DDISCR: discount rate (first time difference) 
DGDP: GDP (first time difference) 
IR_Ratio: 3 months interest rate relative to 10 year bond rate 
DIRRatio: first difference of IR_Ratio 
SMV: stock market volume 




  40Appendix 3: Rate of Return on Equity and Leverage 
Raising the required rate of return (E’) on equity is a typical challenge for managers. If a 
banker wants to raise that rate of return he/she will consider the following equation (i is the 
interest rate, α the ratio of equity capital to total capital, R’ is the total rate of return on 
capital): 
(1)   R’= α E’ + (1-α)i 
(2)   E’ = (1/α)R’ –[(1-α)/α]i 
(3)   E’ = (1/α)R’ + [1- (1/α)]i 
(4)   E’ = i + (1/α)(R’-i)  
Hence the rate of return on equity can be raised by lowering the equity-capital ratio α as long 
as there is a positive difference between R’ and i; alternatively the bank can try to raise the 
differential R’-i. In a system of perfect capital markets (along the logic of the Modigliani-
Miller theorem which argues that the structure of capital is irrelevant for the rate of return on 
equity) the strategy of raising the leverage, namely reducing α, will bring about a rise of the 
bank-specific interest rate which simply offsets the initially favorable effect of lowering the 
equity-capital ratio: The rise of the bank-specific risk premium will neutralize the impact of a 
lower  α. If, however, the capital markets are imperfect – and this is the more realistic 
perspective – the bank, starting with α= 1/10 and i=5% and R’ as 6%, can raise the initial rate 
of return on equity of 15% by a higher leverage: the equity-capital ratio will be reduced to 
1/20 and thus the required rate of return on equity will rise from 15% to 25%. Alternatively, 
the bank could maintain α= 1/10 and try to widen to differential from the initial 1 percent to 2 
percent. This also would raise the rate of return to 25%.  
However, 25% is quite an unrealistic target in the long run since a market economy will face 
standard economic laws: 
•  The nominal interest rate should be equal to the real interest rate r plus the inflation 
rate π. 
•  The real interest rate r should be equal to the growth rate gY of output (Y). 
Thus the real rate of return on equity E”:= E’-π is given by: 
(5)   E“ = gY + (1/α)[R’- (gY + π)]  
Let us denote the real rate of return R” = R’- π, then we can write – assuming a function 
R”(…): 
(6)   E“ = [1-(1/α)]gY + [1/α]R“(Z, gY, a,…) 
For the sake of simplicity we assume that the overall rate of return on capital R“ depends on 
the risk premium Z – incurred by the representative bank -, the real growth rate of the market 
(assume that this growth rate is equal to gY) and the rate of technological progress in banking 
we can use a linearized function R“= q’Z+q“gY+q’’’a (the parameters q’>0, q“>0, q’’’>0) so 
that we get for the case q“>1 that output growth always has a positive impact on E”: 
(7)   E“ = [1-(1/α)(1-q”)]gY + [1/α]q’Z + q’’’a 
 
  41A period with a strong expansion of modern information and communication technology 
(ICT) could go along with a rise oft he progress rate a and this in turn will raise the real rate of 
return for the representative bank. A critical issue is the risk premium Z.   
In the context of the capital asset pricing model we have for the rate of return on stocks v=  r 
+ Ωσ where r is the real rate of return on government bonds, Ω is the price of risk and σ the 
volatility of the respective stock index. If the price of risk should fall artificially – through 
financial innovations – one would get a rise of the investment output ratio provided that σ is 
not rising. 
  
  42Appendix 4: Information for IKB clients (from the website of IKB 
Deutsche Industriebank); IKB-Kundeninformation (IKB, 2005) 
 
 
This document explains to the reader the advantages of ABS and of special purpose vehicles 
where the authors argue that Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation. It had been created by 
the IKB Deutsche Industriebank as a special purpose vehicle; Rhineland Funding had 
received $ 8.1 bill. as a credit line from IKB in order to make sure that Rhineland Funding 
would get a top rating and hence low refinancing costs; IKB invested heavily in subprime 
products – most of which were rate triple A, but this, of course, did not mean absence of 
liquidity risk. Rhineland Funding went bankrupt in 2008 and investors received 55% of the 
money invested; the main prudential supervisory agency in Germany, the BaFin, was fully 
aware of all the transactions of IKB and obviously did not disapprove them although IKB’s 
subprime exposure in absolute terms exceeded that of Deutsche Bank in 2006 – IKB had 
equity of less than € 2 bill. BaFin in its annual report 2008 declared in the preface that it was 
totally surprised by all the financial market developments in the US and did not have a real 
idea of what was going on the US. This is a strange statement for the prudential supervisor of 
the ECB’s largest financial market and has remained without any consequences). The IKB 
information shows that the bank had not fully understood its own product – liquidity aspects 
were not considered and hence it was argued that the product was “without any risk in the 
short term”; the website info states (page 3; translated by the author – the website info was 
deleted from the bank’s website in September 2008): 
„Das SPV refinanziert den Kauf des Forderungsportfolios z.B. durch die Emission von 
Commercial Papers. Hierbei handelt es sich um Wertpapiere mit kurzen Laufzeiten von in der 
Regel 30 bis 60 Tagen, die durch das Forderungsportfolio (deshalb ,Asset Backed´ 
Commercial Papers) besichert sind. Um das notwendige Rating für eine Emission zu 
erreichen, bedarf es häufig einer zusätzlichen Sicherheitenverstärkung (Credit Enhancement). 
Hierbei wird z.B. ein Abschlag auf den Kaufpreis als Besicherungs-,Überhang´ (Over-
Collateralisation) vereinbart und zusätzlich eine Liquiditätslinie durch eine Bank mit einem 
entsprechend guten Rating gestellt. Überdies lassen sich ABS auch mittels einer 
  43Warenkreditversicherung zusätzlich absichern. Aus Sicht der institutionellen Investoren 
handelt es sich hierbei also um eine sehr sichere Kurzfristanlage.“  
(„SPV refinanced acquisition of portfolios of claims, for example through issuing commercial 
papers. Those papers have short maturities, typically in the range of 30 to 60 days; 
commercial papers are backed through the loan portfolio – [thus they are dubbed asset backed 
commercial papers]; often one tries to achieve an adequate rating for a placement, namely 
through credit enhancement. This amounts to considering a price line below the market price 
so that there is over-collateralisation, and in addition one obtains a credit line from a bank 
with a top rating. Moreover, one could additionally reduce the risk of ABS through an 
insurance on the loan portfolio. From the perspective of an institutional investor such a model 
stands for an almost riskless short term investment.)The document was available for about 3 





  44Appendix 5: Serious Doubts about Basel Rules for Required 
Equity Capital 
The Basel I rules as well as the Basel II rules impose a required ratio of equity capital to total 
capital for every bank. Regulatory actors argue that a high equity ratio improves the survival 
prospects of a bank in periods of negative shocks (read: high depreciations and losses, 
respectively). This view, however, is seriously mistaken as will be shown here in the context 
of banks’ consolidated balance sheets. The following presentation is based on KATH (1992), 
who derives – based on the standard BRUNNER-MELTZER approach – the multipliers for 
the money supply (M1) and for credit supply (KR
s). However, the analysis of KATH ignores 
equity capital. In the following analysis equity capital is included on the liability side (equity 
capital is not considered in KATH, 1992) of the banks’ consolidated balance sheet, which is 










Foreign  Reserves    B1 
Government  Bonds    B2 
Refinancing Component    RF 
Monetary Base (Source Side)  B  Monetary Base (Uses Side)    B 
Balance Sheet of Central Bank 
Cash                                           Bc 
Deposits of Banks (Reserves)  TR 
Credit  to  Nonbanks    KR 
Deposits with Central Bank    TR 
Consolidated Balance of Banks 
Sight Deposits of Nonbanks    D1 
Term Deposits of Nonbanks    D2 
Loans from Central Banks    RF 
E q u i t y       E ’  
  45The Basel rules require – among other things – that the equity ratio of a bank should exceed 
8%. Denoting deposits at a bank by D, loans from the central bank by RF and equity capital 
by E’ the above requirement says for an individual bank j that the ratio E’j to credits KRj must 
exceed a critical ratio; the basic argument is that a high ratio of equity to credits serves as a 
cushion for adverse shocks (high allowances or even losses in periods of adverse shocks). 
Let us now consider the aggregate perspective for the banking sector. For simplicity we can 
consider the Basel requirement as 
(I) E‘  =  α’KR (parameter α‘ is in the range between zero and unity);  
The consolidated balance sheet of all banks has on the asset side the credits to nonbanks KR 
and the banks‘ deposits with the central bank (reserves of banks: TR). On the liability side we 
have deposits of nonbanks, namely sight deposits D1 and term deposits D2 plus the credits 
obtained from the central bank (RF) plus equity capital E'. Hence we have the following 
identity from the balance sheet: 
(II)  KR + TR = D1 + D2 + RF + E’ 
Taking into account the regulatory requirement that E’ = α’KR we can write: 
(III)  KR + TR = D1 + D2 + RF + α’KR 
Hence we obtain: 
(IV) KR(1-  α’) + TR = D1 + D2 + RF  
Standard banking theory assumes that banks will want to have a certain ratio (tr) of reserves at 
the central bank to total deposits (D = D1 + D2). Hence the reserve coefficient is defined as: 
(V)  tr = TR/(D1+D2) 
Similarily one may define a desired reserve coefficient rf:  
(VI)  rf = RF/(D1+D2) 
Let d denote the discount rate, i the interest rate on loans and rr the reserve ratio required by 
the central bank one may assume the following function (we indicate negative partial 
derivatives only, eg tri:= ∂tr/∂i; those not indicated explicitly have a positive sign): 
(VII)  tr = tr (rr, i, d), where tri<0 
(VIII)  rf = rf (rr, i, d), where rfd<0. 
Furthermore, one may define (with C
P denoting cash held by nonbanks) the cash balance ratio 
bk:= C
P/D1 and t’ = D2/D1  - we assume t’(i’,YK), where t’YK<0 (i‘ is the interest rate on 
deposits at the bank, YK is the marginal product of capital) – then the definition of the 
monetary base B = C
P + TR gives a money supply multiplier m1 for M1:= C
P+D1: The 
multiplier is defined as 
(IX) m1 = M1/B = (C
P+ D1)/(C
P + TR) 
Dividing the expressions in the numerator and the denominator by D1 (and writing TR/ D1 as 
[(TR/D)( D1+ D2)/ D1] while taking into account D2 = t’ D1 and D2/ D1= t’, respectively) we 
can write: 
 (X)  m1 = (bk + 1)/{bk +[(TR/D)( D1+ D2)/ D1]} 
Thus the money supply multiplier can conveniently be expressed as 
  46(XI) m1= (1+bk) / (bk + tr(1+t’)) 
Next we define the exogenous monetary base B
ex in a suitable way  
(XII) B
ex = C
P + TR –RF 
Taking into account that RF = b‘ (D1+D2) we obtain (in analogy to the procedure above) the 
following multiplier for the exogenous monetary base: 
(XIII) m
ex = (1+bk)/[bk + (tr- b‘)(1-t’)] 
Thus the money supply function can be expressed as: 
(XIV) M1 = m1
ex (i,d,rr,i‘,YK) B
ex
If the multiplier were homogeneous of degree one in YK and production would be 
characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production function Y=K
ß(AL)
1-ß – where K is capital, A 
knowledge and L labor (0<ß<1) - we could simplify the equation by scaling both sides by Y 
and K, respectively; this holds because YK= ßY/K. Note also that we can divide both sides of 
the equation by the price level P so that the left hand side would ride (M/P)/Y which is the 
inverse of the average productivity of real money balances while (B
ex/P)/K is the real 
exogenous monetary base per unit of real capital. 
The partial derivatives with respect to d and rr are negative, those with respect to the marginal 
product of capital (YK) and the deposit interest rate i‘ also if  (tr – b’) <0. Up to this point the 
analysis is fairly standard. However, the following considerations for the credit multiplier 
contain crucial – and paradox - new aspects about the role of equity capital in the banking 
system. The analysis sheds new light on the importance of making a distinction between the 
perspective of the individual bank and the overall banking system. We will basically argue 
that the Basel rules in the field of equity requirement strengthen the ability of individual banks 
to cope with bad weather, but that the same rules also raise the probability of bad weather so 
that one may raise doubts about the Basel I/II rules; revisions of non-optimal rules – while 
ignoring the weakness of the Basel I/II approach – therefore could undermine the stability of 
banks rather than reinforce the resilience and stability of the system. 
 
Credit Supply Multiplier  
Based on equation (IV) one can derive a credit multiplier which implicitly is defined through 
the ratio of credit supply (KR
s) and the exogenous monetary base; the multiplier is denoted as 
a
ex: 




 (XVI)  a
ex = KR/ B
ex =[D1+ D2-TR+RF]/{(1- α‘)[C
P + TR –RF]} 
In the following expression we have taken into account the regulatory requirement that equity 
capital E'= α‘KR. Thus we obtain an expression whose denominator is identical to that of the 
money supply multiplier. More importantly, the regulatory parameter α‘ 
 (XVII)  a
ex = {(1+t‘)(1-(tr-b‘))/(1-α‘)}/[bk + (tr-b‘)(1+t‘)] 
We thus can write   
(XVIII) KR
s =a
ex (α’,i,d,rr,i‘, YK) B
ex  
  47The partial derivatives of the credit multiplier are negative with respect to d, rr and YK, and α, 
positive for i and i’. The higher the required α‘ the lower is 1-α‘. The higher α‘ the higher is 
the credit multiplier. If a high leverage of investment – broadly defined – entails a high 
volatility of asset prices and hence high risk for investors and banks, respectively, one should 
not be surprised that a high required α could raise macroeconomic instability since the 
macroeconomic effect of a higher credit multiplier could offset the (microeconomic) 
cushioning effect of a high equity ratio of individual banks. The hypothesis that a higher 
equity ratio E’/KR could entail a higher macroeconomic volatility implies that there is an 
optimum E’/KR which maximizes long term bank survival S’j= [1-f(σ)]/F(σ) where F(.) is a 
function describing macroeconomic volatility σ and f(.) a function – defined in the range (0,1) 
- which represents the individual bank’s absorption of macroeconomic shocks. The individual 
bank will go bankrupt if S’j reaches a critical threshold as depositors will want to withdraw 
their deposits immediately. 
We may particularly state the hypothesis that a rise of KR
s/M1 above a natural (long term) 
level will raise macroeconomic volatility. Note that the multipliers for the credit supply and 
the money supply have identical denominators so that we can conveniently express the ratio 
KR
s/M1:= Ω’ as: 
(XIX)  Ω’= {(1+t‘)(1-(tr-b‘))/(1-α‘)}/(1+bk) 
Here we have used ln(1+x) ≈x which is a good approximation for x close to zero. Assuming 
that all parameters on the right-hand side of the equation are close to zero we can use the 
convient approximation: 
(XX) ln  Ω’ ≈ t‘ -(tr-b‘)+ α‘ – bk 
Let us denote the degree of confidence loss in the interbanking market by σ‘ – which indeed is 
the risk not to find liquidity in the market – and assume that t’ is a negative function of the 
lack of confidence in the interbank market (the private sector will substitute short-term 
deposits D1 for term deposits D2) and that b’ is a positive function of the lack of confidence 
(as banks will want to rely more one central bank loans in a period of liquidity crisis and as 
the central bank is expected to be a lender of last resort), then we can write 
(XXI) ln  Ω’ ≈ t’(σ‘) -  tr (rr, i, d) + b’(σ‘) + α‘ – bk (i’); 
Note that we also have assumed that bk:=C
P/D1 is a negative function of the deposit interest 
rate i’. Recall that ∂tr/∂i<0, ∂tr/∂rr>0, ∂tr/∂d>0 so that a fall of the discount rate will reduce 
the ratio of credit supply to money supply. In a situation of a non-elastic relative credit 
demand – in a period of a strong economic boom – the above equation implicitly determines 
i/i’ and hence the profitability of banks (one also may argue that the equation determines the 
slope of the yield curve, assuming that banks lends long term and have medium term and 
short term deposits). The impact of the confidence parameter σ’ on the relative loan supply is 
ambiguous so that empirical analysis of t’(.) and b’(.) is necessary to determine the impact of 
a confidence shock. 
Next we consider the fact that a rise of the required equity ratio raises the ratio of loans to the 
money supply. This rise of Ω’ will bring about increased investment in assets – in particular if 
the relative demand for loans is highly elastic (hence in the early economic upswing). If we 
assume for simplicity that the demand for money is proportionate to nominal output and that 
there is equilibrium in the money market at any time we will have a real rise of asset prices, 
namely to the extent that one may assume that loans are used only to a small extent to buy 
  48new goods and services, but rather loans are used to buy existing stocks of capital and real 
estate. The consequence will be asset price inflation (indeed pure asset price inflation if the 
output price level is constant). Real asset prices will be driven above long term equilibrium 
levels and this implies an asset price bubble – a period of rapidly rising asset prices later 
fallowed by a sharp decline in asset prices. This implies that a rise of the ratio KR
s/M brings 
about higher volatility of asset prices and hence higher risk which in turn makes the banking 
sector more vulnerable. While the rise of required regulatory equity capital ratio reinforces the 
ability of banks to weather stormy weather in the market the same rise of that ratio also raises 
the probability that stormy weather will occur. This raises the issue about an optimum equity 
capital ratio. An alternative to the existing regulations could be to require within a new 
approach Basel III that E= α“D + α’FK where the first new element would reinforce the 
individual bank’s ability to absorb adverse shocks while not raising the credit multiplier in the 
case of a rise of α“ (defined in the range 0,1). This can be seen be only looking at the case E’= 
α“D which gives a new multiplier for the credit supply: 
(XXII)   a
ex‘ = (1+t‘)[1 – tr(1+ α“) – b‘]/(bk + (tr-b‘)(1+t‘)) 
Thus one may raise serious doubts about the existing Basel rules in the field of required 
equity capital. Carefully adjusting the framework for banks will be crucial for achieving 
stability. 
 
Real Credit Demand and the Relative Price of Stocks and Real Estate 
Let us consider a setup without inflation and assume that nominal credit demand is given by 
the following simple function 
(XXIII) H
d = η (YP + P’K + P”K”)/(ψ r)  
where P’ is the stock market price index and η and K, respectively, stand for a positive 
parameter and the physical capital stock; K” is the stock of real estate capital and ψ is a 
parameter which indicates the responsiveness of credit demand with respect to the real interest 
rate r. The credit demand function specified assumes that for producing (nominal) output and 
for holding stocks and real estate loans are taken. 
By implication the real credit demand can be written as H/P = η (Y+q’K+q”K”)/( ψ r)  where 
q’:= P’/P and q” denotes the relative price P”/P (P” is the price index of real estate). Next we 
divide both sides of the real credit demand equation by AL (A denotes knowledge, L labor). If 





ex/P we can obviously write KR/P = 
(a
ex/m
ex)(M/P). Taking into account the production function Y= K
ß(AL)
1-ß credit market 
equilibrium – namely (H
d/P)/K = (H
s/P)/K - thus can be written as  
(XXIV)  (a
ex/m
ex)(M/P)/K = (η/(ψr)] (K
ß(AL)
1-ß + q’K + q”K”)/K  
or with k’:=K/(AL) 
   (XXV)    (a
ex /m
ex)(M/P)/K = η (k’
ß-1 + q’ + q”K”/K)/( ψ r) 
If one solves for r and assume for the sake of simplicity that the ratio (a
ex/m
ex) is exogenous 
and also that q’ is exogenous (an alternative assumption would be q’=1 if new investment 
goods and existing capital K are perfect substitutes in the medium term) we get the medium 
term equilibrium real interest rate:  
(XXVI)  r = (m
ex/a
ex )η (k’
ß-1 + q’ + q”K”/K)/{[(M/P)/K]ψ} 
  49The higher the credit multiplier and the monetary policy target ratio (M/P)/K are the lower is 
the real interest rate; the true policy variable is M/K. The price level P will result from the 
excess demand in the goods market. Let us denote the expected inflation rate as π’. If one 
assumes that Y
d= [M
dψ”(r +π’)]/P – this implicitly reflects a money demand function M
d = 
YP/[ψ”(r+π’)] - and consider the price adjustment function dP/dt = h”[Y
d/(AL) -Y#/(AL)] we 
will get (with the steady state income Y# relative to labor in efficiency units AL) the 
following solution for a non-inflationary price level: P = [M/(AL)]ψ”r/(s/(n+a))
ß/1-ß. Note that 
we have replaced k’#:= K’/(AL) by [s/(n+a)]
ß/1-ß which is the standard result from 
neoclassical growth theory under the assumption that the savings rate s and the progress rate a 
(a:= dlnA/dt) as well as the growth rate of labor (n:= dlnL/dt) are exogenous. The production 
function used here is, of course, the Cobb-Douglas function.
The above equation can be interpreted alternatively in a different way. Assume that (M/P)/K 
is determined by monetary policy preferences and that K”/K is given; if r=ßY/K=ßk’
ß-1 – 
reflecting profit maximization of firms (assuming that the capital depreciation is zero) - the 
implication is that Tobin’s q will rise if k’ is raised. Despite a rise of k’ the variables q’ and q” 
could rise if there is a sufficiently strong increase of a
ex/m
ex. Thus a relatively strong increase 
of the (relative) credit multiplier could raise the real price of stocks and the relative price of 
real estate. Financial innovations and a relative rise of the credit multiplier thus could raise q’ 
and q”. This points to some of the problems in the US banking crisis 2007/08. Note that k’ in 
the long run can be replaced – within a neoclassical growth model  – by the steady state 
solution [s/(a+n)]
1/1-ß. If one assumes that q”= Ω”q’– so that Ω” is the relative price P”/P’ – 
we can rewrite the equation as  
   (XXVII)  (a
ex/m
ex)(M/P)/K = η (k’
ß-1 + q’ +  q’Ω”K”/K)/(ψß k’
ß-1) 
 (XXVIII)  (a
ex/m
ex)(M/P)/K = [η/(ψß)] {ψß + [q’(1 +  Ω”K”/K)/k’
ß-1
Here the implication clearly is that a rise of the (relative) credit multiplier will raise the real 
price of stocks P’/P. Parallel to the rise of P’/P there will be a rise of P”/P. 
 
 
  50Appendix 6: Rate of Return to Real Capital (including 
depreciation rate) 
Figure 6:  Rates of Return on Capital in the Business Sector¹ 

























































































G-10 Weighted  
Average 
17.0  14.8  13.8  15.1 15.5 16.0  15.3 
¹  Gross output of the business sector minus net indirect taxes and labor income, all divided 




Source: OECD (1995) 
  51Appendix 7: FDIC-Insured Institutions by Asset Size Categories: 
Numbers, and Return on Assets in Percentage (1998-2008) 
 
Figure 7:   FDIC-Insured Institutions by Asset Size Categories: Numbers, and 
Return on Assets in Percentage (1998-2008) 
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Source: FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, Table III-A December 31. 1999-2008, 
http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/1999dec/qbp.pdf through http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/12008dec/qbp.pdf
* figure in brackets is without 2008 
 
  52Appendix 8: Structural Unemployment Rate, Growth and 
Technological Progress 
Let us briefly take a look at a growth model with a structural unemployment rate (u) – which 
might rise in a period of unstable financial markets -, a given rate of capital depreciation (δ) 
and a given output elasticity of capital (ß). One may note that a standard neoclassical growth 
model (with a Cobb-Douglas production function Y=K
ß(AL)
1-ß; K is capital, A knowledge 
which growth at an exogenous growth rate a, L labor which growth at the exogenous growth 
rate n) in combination with a modified savings function – namely savings S = sY(1-τ)(1-u) –  
and a technological progress function a = a’ – a”u (where s, a’ and a” are positive parameters, 
τ is the income tax rate and u the unemployment rate; s is in the interval (0,1)) gives the 
following solution for output Y relative to labor in efficiency units (AL): 
(I)  y’(t) = {C0e’
-(a’-a”u+n+δ)(1-ß)t + s(1-τ)(1-u)/(a’-a”u+n+δ)}
 ß/1ß
Here y’ denotes the ratio Y/(AL) while C0 is to be determined by the initial conditions, e’ is 
the Euler number and t the time index. In such a setup the unemployment rate negatively 
affects the transitory growth rate and the steady state growth rate, respectively. Moreover, the 
unemployment rate affects the level of the growth path – but the impact is somewhat unclear 
as u is both in the numerator expression and in the denominator of the steady state (denoted 
by #) values which is 
(II)  y’# = [s(1-τ)(1-u)/(a’-a”u+n+δ)]
ß/1ß
In such a setup an NKM model would be inadequate because the steady state solution is not 
independent of the unemployment rate. It also is noteworthy that Y/L will grow in the steady 
state with rate a= a’ – a”u; the term a’ is exogenous, a”u reflects the assumption made, 
namely that a higher unemployment rate pushes the growth rate of knowledge below its 
natural level (which is a’). Thus there is a double need to consider both the dynamics of the 
level of the growth path and the trend growth rate of output; both the level of the growth path 
and the trend growth rate of output are influenced by both u and a. Explaining only the 
deviation of output from trend thus analytically is not satisfactory. As regards the budget 
constraint of government one should  consider that government real consumption G relative to 
AL is given (with v denoting an indicator for the replacement ratio of income for those 
receiving unemployment compensation) by  
(III) G/(AL)  =  τy’ + vu 
As G/(AL) is considered as exogenous – and denoted by γ – the tax rate τ obviously is 
endogenous and can be written in the steady state as: 
(IV) (γ' – vu)/{(s(1-τ)(1-u)/(a’-a”u+n+δ)}
ß/1-ß = τ 
Let us define γ' = 1 – γ” where γ” is a proxy for the degree of political conservatism 
(assuming that conservative voters prefer a small ratio of government expenditures to output). 
Assume furthermore that n+δ is equal to unity so that we can use the approximation ln(1+x)≈ 
x – provided that x is close to zero. Hence taking logarithms gives (with ß’:= ß/(1-ß); it is 
assumed that 0<ß’<1): 
(V)  – ß’lns  + (ß’-v+a”)u – a’ – γ”  ≈ τ(1-ß’) 
  53The tax rate is a positive function of u provided that ß’+a”-v; and it is a negative function of 
the savings rate, the autonomous progress rate a’ and the conservatism proxy γ”. 
(VI)  – ß’lns  + (ß’-v+a”)u – a’ – γ”  ≈ τ(1-ß’) 
Let us define 1-ß’:=ß” and we can write: 
(VII) –(ß’/ß”)lns  +  [(ß’-v+a”)/ß”]u – a’/ß” – γ”/ß” ≈ τ 
From this equation we conclude that the explicit solution of the steady state is given by the 
equation (for the special case that n+δ=1): 





  54Appendix 9: Negative External Effects in Markets for Risks in 
Open Economies 
Let us consider a two-country approach to risk markets (a special niche of insurance markets: 
think of the CDS markets) where demand in country 1 is given by DD0 and supply by SS0; in 
country 2 demand and supply are given by DD*0 and SS*0. There is a market for risk (σ) in 
the home country (panel a)) and a market for risk in the foreign country (panel b)). Under 
autarchy, the price of risk p in the home country (country 1; e.g.  the US) is p0 and it is p*0  in 
country 2. If countries should open up for both trade and capital flows, there will be an excess 
supply in country 1 and an excess demand in country 2. The world market price for risk – for 
credit default swaps for bundles of securities packaged in banks – is p
W
0 . Country 1’s 
insurance industry has expanded (q2 is the supply instead of q0  in the closed economy). 
However, if there are negative national external effects in country 1 – eg due to inadequate 
regulation - the social costs of providing insurance against risk is given by SS01 instead of SS0  
and hence the optimal allocation of resources would be different (at the initial global price for 
risk the welfare loss in country 1 is given by the area KJBA): Instead of being a net exporter 
of risk insurance services country 1 would be net importer of insurance services. Country 2 
would be a net exporter. Moreover, the price of risk under efficient international allocation of 
resources would increase, the new price is p
W
1 (one also may note: an efficient allocation of 
resources implies a real devaluation of the currency of country 1 which makes FDI inflows 
into country 2 more likely; this at least is in line with the standard argument of 
FROOT/STEIN (1991) on the link between FDI inflows and the real exchange rate). If 
country 2 would like to offset the negative external effect in country 1, it might consider 
subsidization of the supply side in country 2. The problem is that the effect of this kind of 
quasi-internalization leads to a fall in the price for risk. To the extent that risk premia in 
various asset markets are interdependent, such a solution would cause an artificially low risk 
premium in the stock market and hence there would be overinvestment. In a two-country 
model the negative external effect in country 1 potentially implies a negative external effect in 
country 2 since comparing the social surplus at the initial world market price with the 
situation in which the price is p
W
1 implies that the consumer surplus is reduced by A*E*B* 
while the producer surplus is raised by E*C*D*; also there is a redistribution effect between 
consumer surplus and producer surplus which is equal to the area P*0*E*C* p
W
1; this effect 
is, of course, not neutral in terms of economic welfare if the risk insurance industry in country 
2 is fully owned by firms from country 1 (to consider a special case which is quite 
interesting). As the supply curve in country 2 starts at a point G* which is above point G in 
country 1 the implication is that the cost competitiveness of country 1 is superior to country 2 
– as long as negative external effects in country 1 are not internalized. As long as there is no 
internalization in country 1 one may assume that there is a considerable likelihood that 
insurance firms from country 1 take over firms from country 2 (recall the logic of the 
FROOT/STEIN argument); and this is inefficient in a crucial sense: corporate governance 
from firms from country 1 will dominate the initial type of governance in firms in country 2. 
If governance of firms in country 1 is a source of negative external effects in country 1 
foreign direct investment now has become a bridge for creating negative external effects also 
in country 2 (the associated supply curve is not shown in the diagram); if ineffective 
regulation of the financial sector in country 1 is the source of negative externality 
  55international regulatory competition – assuming dominance of country 1 – will transmit the 
externality to country 2. Therefore the standard question in the international regulatory debate 
is flawed, namely whether there might be a race to the bottom in terms of standards or 
regulation. The more important issue is whether or not a regime with negative external effects 
has the opportunity to dominate other regimes with no or small external effects. In the context 
of a system with flexible exchange rates there are specific risks to be considered additionally. 
This concerns not only the problem of potential (Dornbusch-type) overshooting of the 
exchange rate. There also is the more general question why banks – after the failure of the 
Herstatt Bank in 1974 - in Germany faced restrictions in holding open positions in the foreign 
exchange markets: The argument for the new framework introduced by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank obviously emphasized the risk of foreign currency speculation. From this 
perspective it is absolutely unclear why individuals in EU accession countries obviously could 
take major exchange rate risks when taking loans in foreign currencies such as Euro or Swiss 
Franc (the majority of those financing cars or homes certainly are risk-averse and thus it is 
absolutely unclear why banks would sell a loan denominated in a foreign currency – unless 
one assumes that banks have speculated that liability rules in the banking sector are not valid). 
Depreciations and in particular exchange rate overshooting could bring illiquidity which for 
some individuals or firms indeed can bring insolvency once spreads are sharply increasing in 
destabilized markets (indeed in a global market system in which one finds a strange 
phenomenon such as “distressed markets” – dead markets - which, according to standard 
theory of a market economy, should not exist at all). 
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